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FREE RIDING ON BENEVOLENCE:
COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM
AND THE MINIMUM COVERAGE
PROVISION
NEIL S. SIEGEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
1

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires most
lawful residents of the United States to maintain a certain level of health
insurance coverage (the minimum coverage provision) or pay a certain amount
2
of money each year (the shared responsibility payment). These provisions go
into effect on January 1, 2014. Present litigation over the ACA focuses
primarily on the constitutionality of these provisions, which are popularly called
3
the “individual mandate” by critics. Those attacking the minimum coverage
provision argue, among other things, that it is beyond the scope of Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce because it regulates inactivity (declining
to obtain health insurance), as opposed to economic activity. To date, one
federal court of appeals (out of three that have decided the merits of the
4
question), as well as three federal district courts (out of six that have decided
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1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. The ACA labels this payment a “penalty.” ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119,
244 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
3. For ease of exposition, this article will now use the term “minimum coverage provision” to
refer collectively to the minimum coverage provision and the shared responsibility payment.
4. Compare Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding minimum coverage
provision as within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (same), with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (invalidating minimum coverage provision as beyond the
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers).
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5

the merits of the question), have invalidated the minimum coverage provision
6
in part on the ground that it regulates inactivity.
The subject matter regulated by the minimum coverage provision can be
characterized as health insurance markets. This characterization makes the
provision appear to regulate inactivity (not obtaining health insurance). The
provision requires individuals either to enter into an insurance contract or to
pay money to the federal government each year if they do not. Critics of the
provision prefer this characterization.
Alternatively, the subject matter regulated by the minimum coverage
provision can be characterized as the interstate healthcare market. Almost all
Americans participate in this market in some fashion, and everyone has access
7
to it regardless of ability to pay in the event of an emergency. Each year,
uninsured Americans in this market obtain more than $50 billion worth of
8
medical services for which other individuals and institutions must pay. This
characterization makes the minimum coverage provision appear to regulate the
activities of delivering and receiving healthcare. Defenders of the provision
9
prefer this characterization.
This distinction between inactivity and activity, however, has nothing to do
with the limits of congressional power granted in the clauses of Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Instead, as Robert Cooter and I have
articulated, the presence or absence of multi-state collective action problems is
10
central to understanding the scope of federal power in the clauses of Section 8.
5. Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL
4072875 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F.
Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for lack of standing, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir.
2011).
6. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled for the federal government
on jurisdictional grounds. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir.
Sept. 8, 2011) (holding that the federal tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA) bars the action); Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that Virginia lacks Article III standing to
bring the action). Other courts have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the TAIA bars
pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum coverage provision. The Supreme Court’s view of the
question will determine whether it reaches the merits. For an argument that the TAIA does not bar the
present challenges to the minimum coverage provision regardless of whether the ACA exaction for
non-insurance is deemed a TAIA “tax,” see generally Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird
Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum
Coverage Provision, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 389 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1042.pdf.
7. See infra notes 175, 176, 177, and accompanying text (discussing federal and state laws
guaranteeing emergency access and longstanding charitable practices of hospitals).
8. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Hospital Association et al. in Support of DefendantAppellant and Reversal at 14, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058), 2011 WL
792216 (reporting that the uninsured received $56 billion in uncompensated care in 2008).
9. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058),
2011 WL 686279.
10. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010). For a similar approach to the commerce power, see
generally Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010).
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These clauses mostly concern collective action problems created by interstate
11
externalities and interstate markets. A prominent example is the Commerce
Clause, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce “among the several
12
States” but not commerce that is internal to a state. The theory of collective
action federalism distinguishes activities that pose collective action problems for
the states from those that do not.
This structural account of Article I, Section 8 draws substantial support from
13
constitutional text, history, and much judicial precedent. For example, the
Framers understood collective action problems well; indeed, the pervasiveness
of such problems among the states during the Critical Period of the 1780s
14
inspired the Constitutional Convention. This structural approach also flows
directly from the relative advantages of the federal and state governments.
Much of what the federal government does better than the states is solve
collective action problems that the states cannot deal with effectively on their
own. According to the theory of collective action federalism, the expanse and
limits of congressional power in the clauses of Section 8 turn in significant part
on the difference between individual and collective action by states.
In order to address multi-state collective action problems, the Constitution
has long been understood to authorize Congress to mandate numerous kinds of
private action. Examples include, but are not limited to, federal requirements to
15
16
file a tax return, respond to the census and do so truthfully, report for jury
17
18
duty, register for selective service, purchase firearms and gear in anticipation
19
of service in the Militia, turn gold currency in to the government in exchange
20
for paper currency, and surrender one’s property to the federal government
when it exercises the power of eminent domain pursuant to its use of the
21
Commerce Clause.
The distinction between individual and collective action by states is an
appropriate place to look for limits on the commerce power. The distinction
between inactivity and activity is not. Like other formal distinctions that have
been introduced throughout American history to restrict the Commerce
22
Clause, the inactivity–activity distinction is arbitrary in a critical sense: It does
11. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 144–50.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 121–24, 144–51, 155–57, 159–80.
14. Id. at 121–24.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2006) (requiring all individuals, except those with very low incomes, to file a
tax return).
16. 13 U.S.C. § 221(a)–(b).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g).
18. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453.
19. See infra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the Militia Act of 1792).
20. Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935).
21. For discussion of this example and others, see infra Part IV.D.
22. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 118 (“The crisis of the Great Depression ultimately
exploded the Lochner Court’s categorical differentiations between ‘manufacturing’ and ‘commerce,’
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on commerce, goods in the ‘flow’ of commerce and goods not in the ‘flow,’
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not speak to the question of why we have a federal government to begin with—
it is unresponsive to the question of what the federal government can
accomplish better than the states can accomplish by acting on their own.
With respect to the Commerce Clause in particular, two things must be true
for federal legislation to fall within its scope. First, the object of congressional
regulation must be fairly describable as “economic” in nature. This is a
23
requirement of current law. Second, Congress must have a reasonable basis to
believe it is ameliorating a significant problem of collective action that exists
24
“among the several States.” This is an interpretation and justification of
current law. If Congress has no reasonable basis to believe it is helping to solve
a significant collective action problem involving multiple states, then Congress
25
may not invoke its commerce power.
Accordingly, whether Congress is mandating private action is irrelevant to
the Commerce Clause inquiry. Congress can mandate private action using its
commerce power, just as it can otherwise regulate private action using its
commerce power, in order to address an economic problem of collective action
among the states—when the states are “separately incompetent,” in the
26
language of the Constitutional Convention, to solve the problem on their own
because the scope of the problem disrespects state borders. The states are
“separately incompetent” when they impose significant costs on one another
27
without paying for them.
The decision whether to obtain health insurance coverage is economic in
nature. It is a decision about how to manage substantial financial risk. The
economic character of this decision is illustrated by the close analogy to the

and ‘harmful’ and ‘harmless’ goods in commerce.”) (footnote omitted).
23. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). For a discussion of the governing doctrine, see infra Part
IV.C.–D.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. A key question for a collective action analysis of federal legislation is the level of judicial
scrutiny and thus the degree of judicial deference to congressional judgments about reasonableness. In
light of empirical uncertainties, many federal laws would flunk heightened scrutiny. Reasonableness,
however, is the appropriate test. Heightened scrutiny in Commerce Clause cases is unheard of in the
Court’s contemporary federalism jurisprudence. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part) (“The
courts do not apply strict scrutiny to commerce clause legislation and require only an ‘appropriate’ or
‘reasonable’ ‘fit’ between means and ends.”) (quoting United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–
57 (2010)).
26. For a discussion, see infra note 99 and accompanying text.
27. As Part V makes clear, the phrase “separately incompetent” is a term of art that is best
understood in light of the historical circumstances out of which it arose. The phrase does not signify
only situations in which it would be impossible for states to achieve an end through individual action.
Such a demanding standard would make it difficult to justify many clauses in Article I, Section 8. For
example, the colonies declared independence and successfully prosecuted a war of independence
without a national government that was empowered to raise and support a military by acting directly on
individuals. The states under the Articles of Confederation were similarly situated, yet there was ample
reason for the Constitution to give Congress the power to raise and support a military by compelling
individual behavior.
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financial conduct of business enterprises that “go bare” with respect to a risk
28
and rely on federal bankruptcy protection in the event the risk materializes.
Thus, the decisive commerce power question is whether Congress could
reasonably conclude that a requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or
pay a fee will help to solve one or more significant collective action problems
involving multiple states.
The ACA minimum coverage provision is reasonably viewed as
ameliorating two significant collective action problems involving multiple states.
The first arises when a financially able individual declines to purchase health
insurance. Such an individual is able to free ride on the benevolence of others in
at least two ways. First, pursuant to federal and state law, as well as the
longstanding charitable practices of most hospitals in the United States, others
will pay a significant share of the cost of medical treatment rather than let an
29
uninsured person go untreated. Second, even when the uninsured individual
does not receive medical care for the time being, he benefits from the existence
of the healthcare infrastructure and can rely on its availability in case of
emergency. A requirement to obtain health insurance coverage or pay for going
without insurance is designed in part to overcome risk-taking in reliance on
30
benevolence.
Moreover, theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that this
free rider problem is interstate in scope—that this collective action problem
involving individuals causes a collective action problem for the states. It is
interstate in scope because of the operation of many insurance companies in
31
multiple states and the phenomenon of cross-state hospital use.
The minimum coverage provision addresses another collective action
problem for the states: guaranteeing access to health insurance while avoiding
adverse selection in insurance markets, which occurs when healthy people delay
the purchase of health insurance until they become ill. The minimum coverage
provision is part of a larger—concededly constitutional—regulation of
economic conduct. No one disputes that the commerce power supports the
ACA provisions that prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage
based on preexisting conditions, canceling insurance absent fraud, charging
higher premiums based on medical history, and imposing lifetime limits on
32
benefits. These provisions solve collective action problems for the states by
facilitating labor mobility, discouraging the flight of insurance companies from

28. See infra notes 160–163, and accompanying text (discussing the practice of “going bare”).
29. See infra notes 175–177, and accompanying text (discussing federal and state legislation and
charitable hospital practices). Of course, not all participants in the interstate healthcare market are
fairly described as benevolent. They may merely be complying with the law. The benevolence is
embodied in federal and state laws and charitable social practices.
30. This rationale for the minimum coverage provision obviously does not apply to individuals
who go without health insurance and pay in full for the cost of their healthcare. In the event of severe
injury or illness, however, such costs can bankrupt even wealthy individuals.
31. For a discussion, see infra Part V.A.3.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2011).

SIEGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

34

4/3/2012 11:28 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75:29

states that guarantee access to states that do not, and disincentivizing states
from free riding on the more generous healthcare systems of sister states.
These ACA provisions, however, would be much less effective without the
minimum coverage provision. Absent the provision, the ACA substantially
increases the existing incentive for financially able individuals without insurance
to free ride on healthy people with insurance by entering the market only when
they expect to require expensive medical care. Insurance companies may not be
financially viable if the law limits their ability to control costs but does not
prevent such market-timing behavior. The close connection between the
minimum coverage provision and the ACA’s restrictions on insurers justifies
the provision under the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in United States
33
34
v. Lopez and Gonzales v. Raich, and under the interpretation of the
35
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland and United States v.
36
Comstock.
Part II of this article defines a free rider problem as a kind of collective
action failure and identifies the two free rider problems to which the ACA
responds. Part III discusses the constitutional challenges to the minimum
coverage provision, focusing on the decisions of courts that have invalidated the
provision. Part IV presents the theory of collective action federalism and
explains generally when Congress possesses the authority to mandate private
action using its commerce power. Part V applies the theory to the minimum
coverage provision.
The Conclusion suggests that the lawfulness of the minimum coverage
provision solves what would otherwise be a puzzle created by the terms of the
present debate over the constitutionality of healthcare reform. This puzzle is
the conceded constitutionality of federal alternatives to the ACA that would
displace state regulatory authority and infringe individual liberty to an equal or
substantially greater extent. These alternatives include a materially equivalent
scheme of taxes and tax credits, and a government-run, single-payer system of
national healthcare.
II
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION AND TWO FREE RIDER PROBLEMS
A. Free Rider Problems Created by Mandated Access to Private Goods
Positive externalities refer to unpriced benefits. They include “public
goods,” which are goods or services supplied by the government whose
technical characteristics require financing by taxes instead of prices. Public
goods are nonrivalrous, meaning that one person’s enjoyment does not detract
from another’s. Moreover, public goods are nonexcludable, meaning that it is
33.
34.
35.
36.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–07, 421 (1819).
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–58 (2010).
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infeasible or uneconomical to exclude individuals from enjoying the benefits
generated by the goods. A classic example of a public good is national defense.
Private provision of public goods does not work because of free rider
problems. When exclusion is infeasible or uneconomical, individuals have an
incentive to free ride by not paying for the benefits they receive. When
beneficiaries do not pay, private suppliers cannot earn a profit. Thus, the
37
market undersupplies the good or service. The government can solve the free
rider problem by collecting taxes to finance public goods, thereby requiring all
who benefit from their provision to pay for them.
Public goods may be analogized to, and distinguished from, mandated access
to private goods. When the government and private actors mandate access to
private goods, they in effect create nonexcludability by law and social practice.
Nonexcludability, in turn, creates free rider problems. Once society decides—as
a matter of public policy or private charity—not to allow the exclusion of
anyone from access to private goods, free rider problems will exist. The free
riders are individuals who obtain the private good, such as healthcare, or who
benefit from its availability (even if they do not presently obtain it) without
obtaining insurance coverage or otherwise paying in full for the care or access
they receive. The free rider problem arises whenever the government and
38
private entities require access to private goods.
By mandating access to private goods, society causes the production of
positive externalities when selectively excluding certain potential beneficiaries
is technically feasible but public policy prohibits doing so. For example,
selective exclusion from access to emergency healthcare is technically feasible
because emergency rooms could demand payment prior to rendering service.
Nonetheless, a government or hospital may decide to require emergency rooms
to provide access to anyone who needs it without regard to insurance status or
ability to pay.
Mandated access to a private good, however, is not a pure public good. If
everyone descends on private providers of the good, at some point the good
ceases to be nonrivalrous. The good is nonrivalrous only if it is used by a limited
number of people. The solution to the free rider problem, however, is similar.
Just as the government can prevent free riding by collecting taxes to finance
public goods, so legislation can ameliorate free rider problems associated with
mandated access to private goods. The ACA seeks to ameliorate two kinds of
free rider problems caused by guaranteed access to private goods.

37. Market failure provides the conventional economic justification for state supply and regulation
of goods. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
38. See, e.g., CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 532 (4th ed. 2010) (observing that “those
without insurance act as free riders on a health care system that has built into it (as a ‘safety net’) many
ways of providing health care to persons who ‘show up at the door’ of health care providers, especially
hospitals and most especially emergency rooms”).
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B. The Affordable Care Act
The ACA is “the biggest expansion of the social safety net in more than four
decades, providing greater economic security to millions of poor and working39
class families.” A major objective of the law is to reduce the number of people
living without health insurance in the United States, the only wealthy,
industrialized democracy that does not guarantee its citizens basic health
40
insurance coverage. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, around 19% of the
nonelderly population, or roughly fifty million people, lacked health insurance
41
in 2009. When he signed the bill into law, President Obama stated that “we
have now just enshrined . . . the core principle that everybody should have some
42
basic security when it comes to their health care.”
The ACA pursues this aspiration by seeking to achieve near-universal
health insurance coverage. The law incentivizes, and helps, most American
43
citizens and other legal residents to obtain adequate and affordable insurance.
The Congressional Budget Office projects that the ACA will increase the
number of nonelderly individuals who possess insurance by roughly thirty-three
44
million by 2019. If the law operates as intended, around 95% of all legal
45
residents will be insured.
“By significantly reducing the number of the uninsured,” Congress found,

39. THE STAFF OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S
NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 66–68 (2010) [hereinafter LANDMARK].
40. See, e.g., T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER,
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 3 (2009) (“All the other countries like us—that is, wealthy,
technologically advanced, industrialized democracies—guarantee medical care to anyone who gets
sick.”).
41. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 23, Table 8; see PHELPS, supra note 38, at
531 (“Recent estimates put the number of Americans without insurance at about 47 million in 2006,
representing 17% of people under 65. The rate of uninsurance climbs to 30% for the 18- to 24-year-old
population.”).
42. LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 1. For an argument that “universal health insurance is essential
for human flourishing,” see generally J.P. Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q.J.
MED. 53 (2007).
43. In various ways, the ACA seeks to ensure that people will be able to afford insurance. First,
the law provides tax credits and subsidies to help people buy private insurance in new state-based
“exchanges.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (West 2011). Thus Congress created federal tax credits for the
premium payments of eligible individuals and families with household income between 133% and
400% of the federal poverty line who purchase coverage through an exchange. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a)–
(c) (West 2011). Congress also created subsidies to help cover out-of-pocket expenses like copayments
or deductibles for eligible individuals who obtain coverage through an exchange. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081
(West 2011). Second, Congress expanded eligibility for Medicaid to all individuals with income below
133% of the federal poverty line. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). Third, Congress created tax incentives
for small businesses to buy health insurance for their employees. 26 U.S.C.A. § 45R (West 2011).
Finally, Congress prescribed exactions for large employers that do not offer full-time employees
adequate coverage if at least one full-time employee receives a tax credit to help with the purchase of
coverage in an exchange. Id. § 4980H.
44. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(Feb. 18, 2011), 7–8.
45. LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 73.
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“the [ACA] . . . will lower health insurance premiums.” Congress determined
that, in 2008 alone, the “cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured
47
was $43,000,000,000.” Congress further found that “health care providers pass
on the cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost48
shifting increases family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.”
Much research confirms these congressional findings. For example, the
American Hospital Association calculated that hospitals furnished more than
49
$39 billion in uncompensated care to the under- or uninsured in 2009. The
federal Department of Health and Human Services found that almost 20% of
the nearly 120 million emergency department visits in 2006 were made by
50
patients who lacked health insurance. A standard text in the field of health
economics reports on “the apparent mechanism for receiving medical care”
when individuals without insurance become ill: “Commonly, these people
appear either at a hospital clinic or a hospital emergency room, often leading to
51
hospitalization.”
In his survey of the research, Mark Hall reports that “almost two-thirds
(62.6%) of people who are uninsured at a given point in time had at least one
visit to a doctor or emergency room within the prior year,” and “virtually all of
52
them (94%) receive some level of medical care at some point.” Moreover,
“uninsured people pay for only about a third of the overall costs of the services
they receive; the rest is paid by government, charity, or cost shifting to insured
53
patients.”
Importantly, a significant share of the uninsured population in the United

46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (West 2011).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE COST FACT SHEET 4 (2010),
http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/10uncompensatedcare.pdf. The AHA defines “uncompensated care”
as “care provided for which no payment is received . . . delivered in U.S. hospitals.” Id. at 1. It is the
sum of a hospital’s “bad debt” and charity care. Id. Charity care is care for which a hospital expects no
reimbursement. A hospital incurs bad debt when it cannot obtain expected reimbursement. Id.
50. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NEW DATA SAY UNINSURED ACCOUNT FOR
NEARLY ONE-FIFTH OF EMERGENCY ROOM VISITS (July 15, 2009), http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/
pr2009/hhsuninserpr.htm.
51. PHELPS, supra note 38, at 532 (noting the findings that “hospital use is relatively insensitive to
insurance coverage”).
52. Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825,
1832 n.29 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. (citations omitted); see, e.g., FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A
PREMIUM 2 (2009) (finding that the uninsured in the United States received $116 billion worth of care
from hospitals, doctors, and other providers in 2008; that government programs and charities paid for
26% of this care; and that around $42.7 billion was unpaid and thus uncompensated care); Sara
Rosenbaum & Jonathan Gruber, Buying Health Care, the Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 402 (2010) (“Far from being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume
more than $50 billion in uncompensated care, the costs of which are passed through health care
institutions to insured Americans. . . . [M]edical expenses not covered by insurance are one of the
leading causes of bankruptcy in the United States, and the costs of resolving those bankruptcies are
borne throughout the U.S. economy.”).
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States consists of individuals who are financially able to purchase health
insurance. Researchers have estimated that as much as “20 percent of uninsured
individuals have the financial means to obtain coverage but forgo it, relying
54
instead on emergency care when they need medical treatment.” Although
some question the extent to which there is a free rider problem involving
55
uncompensated care, economists have shown that public insurance programs,
including uncompensated care reimbursement funds, reduce the purchase of
private health insurance. These findings confirm the predictions of theoretical
56
models of individual choice. The import of this “crowding out” effect is that a
substantial percentage of uninsured people who consume healthcare without
paying for it in full have the financial means to obtain health insurance coverage
and would obtain it if cost shifting were impossible.
It is uncertain and disputed how much of the cost shifting problem is
attributable to individuals who have the financial means to obtain health
insurance coverage. Although it is clear that many individuals who shift costs to
others cannot afford to purchase private insurance, it is also clear that many
57
individuals who shift costs to others can afford to purchase private insurance.
Moreover, even young and healthy people can be traumatically injured at any
moment and can reasonably rely on access to life-saving treatment in case of
emergency. In all likelihood, significantly fewer individuals would choose to go
without insurance if they knew that they were on their own if they fell gravely ill
or were severely injured.
The ACA targets this cost shifting problem with the minimum coverage
54. Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
8–9, Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11–1057 & 11–1058), 2011 WL 795219
[hereinafter Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans] (reporting that when uninsured individuals
require care, “hospitals and other providers charge those who do have coverage higher prices”; that the
“higher prices, in turn, translate into increased health insurance premiums for those who purchase
insurance coverage”; and that the “insured are ultimately hit with a ‘hidden tax’ ranging from two to
ten percent of private premiums to pay for this uncompensated care”) (citations omitted).
55. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Commentary, Free Rider: A Justification for Mandatory
Medical Insurance Under Health Care Reform?, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 78, 79 (2011).
56. See generally Kevin N. Rask & Kimberly J. Rask, Public Insurance Substituting for Private
Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, Uncompensated Care Funds, and Medicaid, 19 J.
HEALTH ECON. 1 (2000) (finding that the presence or increased generosity of public health insurance
programs, whether structured as direct provision of services, as provider subsidies, or as direct
insurance, lowered the likelihood of carrying private insurance coverage); cf. David Cutler & Jonathan
Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private Insurance?, 111 Q.J. ECON. 391 (1996) (finding that
Medicaid expansions were associated with a significant transition from private health insurance to
being uninsured).
57. See Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Insurance
Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 457, 477 (2011) (“[H]ospital administrators report that they collect only
about ten percent of their charges to uninsured patients. This highly-subsidized care is not restricted to
uninsured people without means to pay, but includes people well above poverty. Among adults who
decline the option to enroll with employer-sponsored insurance, public sources and uncompensated
care cover 72% of total costs.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Bradley Herring, The
Effect of the Availability of Charity Care to the Uninsured on the Demand for Private Health Insurance,
24 J. HEALTH ECON. 225–52 (2005) (finding that individuals above 300% of the federal poverty level
on average paid for only about one-half of the care they received).
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provision. The provision requires nonexempted individuals to maintain a
58
minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay a yearly fee. This exaction
is inapplicable to people who need not file a federal income tax return because
their household incomes are too low, to people whose premium payments
would be greater than 8% of their household income, to individuals who are
uninsured for short periods of time, to members of Native American tribes, and
to people who show that compliance with the requirement would impose a
59
hardship. The minimum coverage provision seeks to ameliorate the cost
shifting that occurs when individuals who have the financial means to purchase
insurance consume healthcare without insurance and do not pay in full, thereby
free riding on other participants in the health insurance and healthcare
60
markets.
The minimum coverage provision also seeks to address a second kind of free
61
rider problem: adverse selection (or self-selection) in insurance markets. The
problem arises, even absent mandated access to healthcare, because people
know more about their own health status than insurance companies do. Before
the ACA, health insurance companies had managed the costs borne by existing
62
policyholders through an actuarial process known as underwriting.
Specifically, insurance companies assessed the health status of each applicant
for insurance; predicted the likely medical costs associated with different health
statuses; and either offered coverage to certain individuals, declined to offer
coverage to certain individuals, or offered coverage subject to various
exceptions and limitations. These underwriting practices ameliorated the
adverse-selection problem but did not eliminate it because of the information
asymmetry between insurers and potential insureds.
The ACA exacerbates the adverse-selection problem by changing the way in
which private health insurance markets operate. The ACA requires insurers to
provide and renew coverage to anyone who wants coverage and pays the
63
premium. The law prohibits insurers from denying coverage based on
preexisting conditions, charging higher premiums based on an individual’s
medical history, canceling insurance absent fraud, and imposing lifetime limits
58. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2011). The minimum coverage provision goes into effect on
January 1, 2014. It applies to U.S. citizens and legal residents. It does not apply to undocumented
aliens, people in prison, and people with certain religious objections.
59. Id. § 5000A(e). In 2014, the annual exaction for non-insurance will be the greater of $95 or 1%
of income. By 2016, the annual exaction will be the greater of $695 or 2.5% of income. Id. § 5000A(c).
60. It is important to distinguish between individuals who have the financial ability to purchase
health insurance and individuals who do not. People who cannot afford to buy coverage still shift costs,
but as noted in the text, the ACA’s exaction for going without insurance does not apply to them.
Moreover, they are not fairly described as choosing not to purchase insurance, nor are they fairly
criticized for free riding on the contributions of others to collective action.
61. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 38, at 318–19. For an empirical analysis of the welfare costs of the
adverse selection problem in health insurance markets, see generally David M. Cutler & Sarah J.
Reber, Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113
Q.J. ECON. 433 (1998).
62. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(J) (West 2011).
63. Id. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-2.
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on benefits.
These insurance practices encourage individuals to purchase insurance
before they require extensive care. Because the ACA eliminates them, insurers
will instead set premiums based on the average expected costs generated by an
insurance company’s entire risk pool. Other things being equal, this change
would render participation in the pool relatively more attractive to older, sicker
individuals and less attractive to younger, healthier people. Costs would rise for
individuals who have insurance and individuals without insurance would have
even more incentive to remain uninsured until they become ill. The result
would be even more cost shifting to other actors in the interstate healthcare
market.
Once the law forbids insurers from denying coverage to sick applicants, a
person who does not buy insurance until he is already sick free rides on people
who buy insurance while they are still healthy. Indeed, the very concept of
insuring against a risk unravels when “insurance” may be purchased after the
risk has already materialized. The minimum coverage provision seeks to make
it economically feasible for insurers to comply with the ACA’s changes in the
methods used by insurers to spread risk and price premiums. By requiring
almost everyone to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a yearly fee, the
provision reduces the incentive to remain uninsured until one becomes ill.
Congress found that the insurance “requirement is essential to creating effective
health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its
65
associated administrative costs.”
III
THE CHALLENGES TO THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
Although the ACA contains many provisions, the numerous constitutional
66
challenges to the statute focus primarily on the minimum coverage provision.
A key question that is emerging is whether the provision is supported by the
67
Commerce Clause —either alone or in combination with the Necessary and
68
Proper Clause.
64. Id. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12.
65. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
66. Additional questions include whether the TAIA (see supra note 6) bars pre-enforcement
challenges to the exaction for going without insurance; whether any state plaintiff has standing to sue;
whether the minimum coverage provision is severable from the rest of the ACA; whether it is
unconstitutionally coercive under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), for Congress to condition
all existing federal Medicaid funding on the states’ acceptance of new expansions to the Medicaid
program; whether Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to mandate that employers offer
employees a certain level of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty; and whether the mandate
violates principles of religious freedom protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment
Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In
addition to the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on the TAIA question, the severability question, and the Medicaid expansion.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Id. at cl. 18.
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To date, no federal court has upheld the minimum coverage provision as
69
within the scope of Congress’s tax power. By contrast, the federal courts
presently disagree about whether the provision is justified by the Commerce
Clause. So far, three federal district courts and two federal courts of appeals
70
have rejected commerce power challenges to the provision. Three other
federal district courts and one federal court of appeals have held that the
71
provision is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. The latter district
courts reasoned that Congress may regulate only economic activity using its
commerce power and that the provision regulates inactivity—specifically, the
failure to purchase health insurance. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned similarly in invalidating the minimum coverage
72
provision.
73
In Virginia v. Sebelius, which involved a constitutional challenge to the
ACA brought by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the district court read the
Supreme Court’s commerce power decisions as directing first that “the subject
matter must be economic in nature and affect interstate commerce, and second,
74
it must involve activity.” The court observed that “[e]very application of
Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme
Court involved some sort of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an

69. But cf. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *16 (4th Cir. Sept. 8,
2011) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[W]ere I to reach the merits, I would uphold the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority to enact the individual and employer
mandates under its plenary taxing power.”). For an argument that the ACA exaction for non-insurance
is materially equivalent to a tax, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: A
Theory of the Tax Power for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power, 99 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013). Commentators dispute whether the General Welfare Clause supports the minimum coverage
provision. Compare, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 607–14 (2010) (arguing that the
minimum coverage provision is beyond the scope of the tax power), with, e.g., Brief of Constitutional
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Liberty Univ., No. 10–2347, 2011
WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (arguing that the tax power authorizes the minimum coverage
provision), and Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 27 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf.
70. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner,
753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D.
Mich. 2010).
71. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.
2011); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL 4072875
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
72. Notwithstanding the emphasis of these courts on the coerciveness of the minimum coverage
provision in their commerce power analyses, Lochner-style substantive due process challenges to the
provision are not surviving motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1161–62 (N.D. Fla. 2010). The Supreme Court has not
held that a statute violates freedom from contract since the constitutional crisis of 1937. Compare, e.g.,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
73. 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).
74. Id. at 781.
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individual or legal entity.” Reasoning from this premise, it stated that the
“constitutional viability of the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision in this
case turns on whether or not a person’s decision to refuse to purchase health
76
care insurance is such an activity.” The court concluded that such a decision is
not activity because neither the Supreme Court nor any federal court of appeals
“has extended Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to
involuntarily enter the stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the
77
private market.” It was particularly concerned that a rationale “requiring
advance purchase of insurance based on a future contingency” would also
“apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions,” and thus “lacks
78
logical limitation.”
79
Similarly, in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, a
case involving a constitutional challenge to the ACA brought by the attorneys
general of twenty states and the governors of six more, the district court
concluded that “[i]t would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold
80
that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.” According
to the court, if Congress “has the power to compel an otherwise passive
individual into a commercial transaction with a third party,” then “it is not
81
hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted.”
The court raised the specter of Congress’s “mandating that every adult
purchase and consume wheat bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that
because everyone must participate in the market for food, non-consumers of
82
wheat bread adversely affect prices in the wheat market.” “Congress could,” it
asserted, “require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals,
not only because the required purchases will positively impact interstate
commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and
83
are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.”
According to the court, “[t]o now hold that Congress may regulate the so-called
‘economic decision’ to not purchase a product or service in anticipation of
future consumption is a ‘bridge too far.’ It is without logical limitation and far
exceeds the existing legal boundaries established by Supreme Court
84
precedent.”
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in partially
85
affirming the judgment of the Florida district court, purported not to rely on
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 781.
780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id. at 1294–95.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that the minimum coverage
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the plaintiffs’ and the district court’s distinction between inactivity and activity.
The distinction, however, did the decisive work in the court’s analysis. For
example, after stating that “[i]t is immaterial whether we perceive Congress to
be regulating inactivity or a financial decision to forego insurance,” the court
insisted that “[u]nder any framing, the regulated conduct is defined by the
absence of both commerce or even the ‘the production, distribution, and
87
consumption of commodities’—the broad definition of economics in Raich.”
In passages such as this one, the court of appeals avoided characterizing the
minimum coverage provision as a regulation of “inactivity” only by recasting it
as a regulation of “noncommerce.” But the court viewed the provision as
regulating the absence of commerce only because individuals subject to it are
88
(allegedly) not active in the stream of commerce. The court seemed to change
89
the terminology, not the analysis.
As explained in Part V.A.2, it is far from clear that the financial decision to
go without insurance is properly characterized as “inactivity” for purposes of
analysis under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Nonetheless, the ACA litigation to date invites examination of whether it
matters how such conduct is characterized. I turn now to the constitutional
relevance of the distinction between inactivity and activity. I begin by
introducing the theory of collective action federalism.
IV
THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION FEDERALISM
A. History
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “Commerce . . .
90
among the several States.” It is the third clause of Article I, Section 8. The
Framers wrote Section 8 in order to address several collective action problems
91
facing the United States during the Critical Period of the 1780s. They
provision was not severable from the balance of the ACA. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
86. Id. at 1285 (“Whereas the parties and many commentators have focused on this distinction
between activity and inactivity, we find it useful only to a point. . . . [W]e are not persuaded that the
formalistic dichotomy of activity and inactivity provides a workable or persuasive enough answer in this
case.”).
87. Id. at 1293 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
88. The court defined “[t]he question before us” as “whether Congress may regulate individuals
outside the stream of commerce, on the theory that those ‘economic and financial decisions’ to avoid
commerce themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.” Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at
1292.
89. Accord Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10–CV–763, 2011 WL
4072875, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011) (“To date, all exercises of Commerce Clause authority have
proscribed or prescribed activity by individuals already engaged in commerce who are active in the
relevant interstate market.”).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
91. For a discussion, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23
(1999).
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especially wanted to protect the states from commercial warfare against one
another and from military warfare by foreigners. In the Critical Period, the
states acted individually when they needed to act collectively, discriminating
against interstate commerce and free riding on the contributions of other states
92
to the federal treasury and the American military. Moreover, Congress lacked
93
power under the Articles of Confederation to address these problems.
James Madison saw the collective action problems in his Vices of the
94
Political System of the United States, a memorandum he wrote while preparing
95
for the Constitutional Convention. Recording various problems with the
96
Articles of Confederation, Madison underscored “want of concert in matters
where common interest requires it,” a “defect . . . strongly illustrated in the state
of our commercial affairs. How much has the national dignity, interest, and
97
revenue suffered from this cause?” When activities spilled over from one state
to another, Madison and other nationalist Framers recognized that the actions
of individually rational states produced irrational results for the nation. This is
one kind of collective action problem. The solution lay with the establishment
of a more comprehensive unit of government. The federal government would
require the authority to tax, regulate interstate and international commerce,
raise and support a military, and act directly on individuals.
The delegates at the Philadelphia Convention, in considering the scope of
congressional power that would become Section 8, focused on collective action
98
problems for the states. The Convention instructed the midsummer
Committee of Detail that Congress have authority “to legislate in all Cases for
the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which the States
are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may
99
be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.” This language
100
apprehends the need to address collective action problems facing the states.
Significantly, when the Committee of Detail made its report ten days later, “[i]t
92. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 121–24.
93. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (discussing various failures of the
Articles of Confederation). Almost all of the first thirty-six essays in The Federalist detail the
inadequacies of the Articles.
94. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 69, 78–79 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
95. See RAKOVE, supra note 93, at 46.
96. Madison, supra note 94, at 69–73.
97. Id. at 71.
98. As Akhil Amar explains, “Federal power over genuinely interstate and international affairs lay
at the heart of the plan approved by the Philadelphia delegates.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005).
99. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
100. It is not clear how each part of the quoted language fits with the other parts. Donald Regan
explains that “[t]he Framers themselves were unclear about the precise reach and interrelations of the
various clauses.” Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 570 n.70 (1995).
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had changed the indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration of
the powers of Congress closely resembling Article I, Section 8 of the
101
Constitution as it was finally adopted.”
The Committee’s “radical change” was uncontroversial among the
delegates; the Convention “accepted without discussion the enumeration of
powers made by a committee which had been directed . . . that the Federal
Government was ‘to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the
102
Union . . . and in those to which the states are separately incompetent.’” The
delegates apparently grasped the link between the general principles stated in
Resolution VI and the specific powers conferred in Article I, Section 8. As
numerous scholars have concluded, the Committee was embracing—not
rejecting—the Resolution’s concern about multi-state collective action
103
problems when it provided an enumeration.
Robert Cooter and I have observed that the eighteen clauses of Section 8
mostly concern collective action problems created by two kinds of spillovers:
104
interstate externalities and national markets. Clauses 1 and 10 through 16 give
Congress the power to internalize the externalities associated with providing for
the common defense, establishing a postal network, and securing intellectual
105
property rights. Clauses 3 through 6 give Congress the power to combat
106
various impediments to the successful operation of interstate markets.
B. Theory
The theory of collective action federalism draws from this history, from this
evidence in the constitutional text, from subsequent historical understandings
and mistakes, and from economics to provide a structural account of the
American federal system established in part by Article I, Section 8. The various
clauses of Section 8 form a coherent set—not a heterogeneous collection of
unrelated powers. Coherence comes from the connection that the specific
powers have to collective action problems that the federal government can
address more effectively than the states can address by acting alone.
The states often cannot achieve an end when doing so requires multiple
101. Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1340 (1934).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 10, at 11 (“[T]here is no evidence that the convention rejected the
structural principle stated in Resolution VI at any point during its proceedings. Indeed, this principle
was the animating purpose of the list of enumerated powers that appeared in the final draft . . . .”)
(emphasis added); Regan, supra note 100, at 556 (“[T]here is no reason to think the Committee of
Detail was rejecting the spirit of the Resolution when they replaced it with an enumeration.”); Stern,
supra note 101, at 1340 (“If the Convention had thought that the committee’s enumeration was a
departure from the general standard for the division of powers to which it had thrice agreed, there can
be little doubt that the subject would have been thoroughly debated on the Convention floor.”).
104. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 144–50 (analyzing the eighteen clauses of Article I,
Section 8).
105. Id. at 147–49.
106. Id. at 149–50.
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states to cooperate—that is, when doing so requires collective action. For
example, collective action may be required in “race to the bottom” situations,
when the states generally share the same objective but individually have
insufficient incentives to take steps to achieve it. In this circumstance, the
rational self-interest of individual states is misaligned with the collective interest
of the states as a whole. Individual states may have poor incentives to act either
because they can instead free ride on the contributions of other states to
collective action, or because they anticipate that sister states will free ride on
107
their own contributions to collective action.
Although a race to the bottom is an important kind of collective action
problem that justifies federal regulation, it is not the only one. Limiting
collective action problems to races to the bottom would have radical
implications for the constitutional scope of federal power. For example,
collective action by the states may be required when one state or group of states
imposes external costs on other states, such as by generating pollution that
crosses states lines. In such a situation, the state producing the pollution and the
states being polluted may not share the objective of reducing pollution. On the
contrary, people in states such as Texas and California often have different
views on the appropriate tradeoff between economic development and
108
environmental protection. Even so, internalizing an interstate pollution
externality requires collective action among the affected states, which justifies
109
federal intervention.
110
Similarly, consider a historical example of enormous significance. Racial
discrimination in America during the second half of the twentieth century
caused a collective action problem for the states. In the 1960s, this collective
action problem was not the fact that southern states wanted to abandon
107. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (placing special emphasis on a
race to the bottom among the states in upholding the federal unemployment compensation system
created by the Social Security Act).
108. Moreover, a state may not suffer the effects of pollution it creates. See, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN
& BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 22 (3d ed. 2010) (using the
example of acid rain to illustrate that “[a]ir pollution, water pollution, and wildlife certainly pay no
heed to state . . . borders, with the result that often the generator of the pollution is politically distinct
from those harmed”); see also Press Release, N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Northeast States Press for Clean
Air (Jan. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2002/jan/jan08a_02.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2012) (quoting Rhode Island Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse’s statement that
“outdated coal-fired electric plants in the Midwest make cheap power for Midwestern corporations,
and prevailing winds blow their pollution onto us,” and that “ozone pollution from the Midwest is so
bad that even if we stopped all our in-state emissions entirely, we would still fail federal ozone
standards in Rhode Island”).
109. For a lucid explanation of why spillover effects justify federal regulation, see generally Richard
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); see also
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 172–75 (articulating a collective action rationale for federal
regulation of interstate environmental externalities).
110. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination by places of public
accommodation); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II’s application to a
small, family-owned restaurant).
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discrimination but had insufficient incentive to do so on an individual basis. No
doubt most (white) voters in southern states had no desire to abandon
discrimination. But the fact that some states practiced racial discrimination
created a significant burden on commerce with those states that did not practice
discrimination, impeding both interstate mobility and the optimal allocation of
111
resources across state lines. A remedy to this interstate externality required
112
collective action by the states. Accordingly, the theory of collective action
federalism provides a justification for federal power over discrimination
113
affecting interstate commerce.
Whether the cause of a problem requiring collective action is a race to the
bottom or an interstate spillover effect, the theory of collective action
federalism concludes that the clauses of Section 8 empower Congress to solve
the problem because it predictably frustrates the states. In the language of the
Commerce Clause, such a problem is “among the several States.” Conversely, a
problem that does not require collective action by the states is internal to a state
or local. Thus the foundation of federalism in Section 8 flows from the relative
advantages of the federal government and the states. The theory of collective
action federalism reads the clauses of Section 8 as giving the federal and state
114
governments the power to do what each does best.
The distinction between individual and collective action by states gives
independent, sensible meaning to the phrase “among the several States” in the
Commerce Clause. According to the theory of collective action federalism, the
phrase “among the several States” references a collective action problem
115
involving at least two states. This is the key inquiry in determining whether
111. The briefing on the federal government’s side in Heart of Atlanta stressed the interstate
externalities caused by racial discrimination in certain states. See generally, e.g., Brief for State of
California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964 WL 81384.
112. Accord Balkin, supra note 10, at 7 (“Properly understood, the commerce power authorizes
Congress to regulate problems or activities that produce spillover effects between states or generate
collective action problems that concern more than one state.”). Whereas Balkin identifies spillover
effects and collective action problems as separate categories that both fall within the scope of federal
commerce power, I identify spillover effects as causing a collective action problem, which justifies
federal commerce power. The result is the same.
113. Of course, the moral and historical bases for civil rights legislation lie elsewhere, which may
call into question the restrictions that the Supreme Court has imposed on the enforcement clauses of
the Civil War Amendments.
114. As Donald Regan has written, “[W]hen we are trying to decide whether some federal law or
program can be justified under the commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, ‘Is there
some reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the
matter to the states?’” Regan, supra note 100, at 555; see also Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism
After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793, 817 (1996) (“We should begin a reconstruction of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that looks deeply into why it is good for some matters to be governed
by a uniform federal standard, why it is good for some things to remain under the control of the various
states, and what effect these choices will have on the federal courts.”). See Stephen G. Calabresi &
Nicholas K. Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV.
1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in American history for empowering our national
government has been the need to overcome collective action problems.”).
115. Notably, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824),
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“Commerce,”
understood under current law in terms of the Court’s
economic–noneconomic categorization, is interstate and thus regulable under
the Commerce Clause or else is intrastate and thus beyond the scope of the
117
commerce power. Even if the economic–noneconomic categorization can
suffice as a rough definition of “Commerce,” it cannot define when such
commerce is “among the several States” and when it is internal to one state.
From a collective action perspective, it makes little sense to conclude that
only the states may address a particular problem even though the states are
118
“separately incompetent” to handle the problem. This was a fatal flaw of the
Lochner Court’s federalism jurisprudence, which rejected the idea that “the
power of the federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the
nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal or cannot
119
adequately deal.” To the Lochner Court, it was of little relevance to the
proper scope of congressional power in Section 8 that “[t]here are many
subjects in respect of which the several states have not legislated in harmony
with one another, and in which their varying laws and the failure of some of
120
them to act at all have resulted in injurious confusion and embarrassment.”
The Lochner Court’s federalism jurisprudence was not just bad political theory
or economics. As explained by the theory of collective action federalism, it was
bad constitutional law in light of a principal purpose of the clauses of Section 8:
to authorize Congress to solve collective action problems facing states.
C. Doctrine
The distinction between problems that require collective action by the states
and those that do not best explains why Congress may not usually use its
commerce power to regulate such crimes as assault or gun possession in schools
but may regulate an interstate market for guns, wheat, or drugs. In other words,
the theory of collective action federalism offers a way to distinguish the “truly
121
national” from the “truly local” in the context of the Commerce Clause,
122
123
justifying the outcomes in Wickard v. Filburn, United States v. Lopez, United
that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “that commerce which concerns more
States than one.”
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
117. Collective action federalism is a theory of what Section 8 means, not a theory of how
vigorously the federal courts should review what Congress has purported to do using its Section 8
powers. The theory to date does not include an account of judicial deference or nondeference. See
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 154.
118. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 99, at 131–32.
119. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“The proposition . . . that the power of the
federal government inherently extends to purposes affecting the Nation as a whole with which the
states severally cannot deal or cannot adequately deal . . . ha[s] never been accepted but always
definitely rejected by this court.”); see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918) (“There is no
power vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible
unfair competition.”).
120. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 292.
121. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
122. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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States v. Morrison, and Gonzales v. Raich.
The Court offered collective action problems as a reason to uphold federal
laws in many of the Commerce Clause cases decided from 1937 until the
126
1990s. So, too, the Rehnquist Court implicitly considered collective action
problems in determining the constitutionality of congressional regulation. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones Act “is not
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
127
regulated.” This statement suggests that the absence of regulation of guns
near schools in one state would not undercut the effectiveness of regulations
prohibiting them in other states. Justice Kennedy wrote that if a state or local
government “determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to
deter students from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of
the States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over forty states
already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near
128
school grounds.”
In Lopez, there was no significant spillover of welfare across state lines that
caused a collective action problem. Raich, by contrast, did involve a potential
spillover problem. Because marijuana used for medicinal purposes is
indistinguishable from marijuana used for other purposes, and because the
market for marijuana disrespects state borders, California’s authorization of
marijuana use for medicinal purposes might make it more difficult for other
states to enforce their bans on marijuana use. If there is no spillover problem,
states should be permitted to go their own way from the perspective of
129
constitutional federalism (as opposed to individual rights). But a spillover
provides a rationale for federal intervention.
The Supreme Court also employed collective action reasoning in a recent
130
decision construing the Necessary and Proper Clause. The issue in United
123. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
124. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
125. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
126. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 159–62 (discussing collective action reasoning in
numerous Commerce Clause decisions decided between 1937 and 1995, including United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
127. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
128. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Regan, supra note 100, at 566
(reading this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion from a collective action perspective).
129. A collective action approach does not explain the proper scope of federal powers authorized
by the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments. U.S. CONST
nuail
. amend.
War clabaartc0
X6s85; v. Tcs st
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131

States v. Comstock was whether Congress has the power under Article I,
Section 8 to authorize the Attorney General of the United States to civilly
commit mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners after the completion
of their federal sentences if no state will accept custody of them. The Court held
7–2 that Congress has such authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
relying in part on the fact that the case implicated a collective action problem
involving multiple states.
The Court recognized the “NIMBY” problem (“not in my backyard”).
After the sentence of a sexually dangerous prisoner has expired, the federal
government might release him for civil commitment in any number of states,
including the state where he had been tried or the state where he is presently
housed. A state that agrees to assume custody of the prisoner must pay all the
financial costs associated with indefinite civil commitment while other states
potentially enjoy all the benefits from committing the individual, who might
otherwise move out of state. If not committed, he might move out of state upon
release in part because the federal government had severed the prisoner’s ties
to the state by incarcerating him for a long time. Rather than dwell on the fact
that the federal government helped to create the problem that it now sought to
solve, the Court underscored evidence that states often refuse to assume
custody, potentially hoping to free ride on some other state’s decision to do
132
so. Both the Court and Justices Kennedy and Alito, who concurred in the
judgment, stressed the relationship between the federal statute at issue and a
multi-state collective action problem, which the federal government is better
133
situated to address than the states.
D. Mandates
The clauses of Article I, Section 8 extend federal legislative authority to
collective action problems involving multiple states. It is constitutionally
irrelevant whether federal regulation takes the form of an “individual mandate”

131. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1961–62 (2010).
132. Id. at 1959 (quoting a 1945 Judicial Conference report finding that “[s]tates would not accept
an ‘appreciable number’ of ‘mental[ly] incompetent’ individuals ‘nearing expiration’ of their prison
terms, because of their ‘lack of legal residence in any State,’ even though those individuals ‘ought not . .
. be at large because they constitute a menace to public safety’”); id. at 1961 (“Congress could . . . have
reasonably concluded (as detailed in the Judicial Conference’s report) that a reasonable number of
such individuals would likely not be detained by the States if released from federal custody, in part
because the Federal Government itself severed their claim to legal residence in any State by
incarcerating them in remote federal prisons.”) (quotation marks omitted).
133. Justice Kennedy emphasized that “Federal prisoners often lack a single home State to take
charge of them due to their lengthy prison stays, so it is incumbent on the National Government to
act.” Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Similarly, Justice Alito underscored the
statute’s recognition “that, in many cases, no State will assume the heavy financial burden of civilly
committing a dangerous federal prisoner who, as a result of lengthy federal incarceration, no longer has
any substantial ties to any State.” Id. at 1969 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); see id. at 1970 (“These
federal prisoners, having been held for years in a federal prison, often had few ties to any State; it was a
matter of speculation where they would choose to go upon release; and accordingly no State was
enthusiastic about volunteering to shoulder the burden of civil commitment.”).
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or some other form. Section 8 has long been understood to authorize Congress
to mandate various actions by private individuals. Examples include requiring
134
135
people to file a tax return, respond to the census and do so truthfully,
136
137
register for selective service, respond to a congressional subpoena, and
138
report for jury duty.
Similarly, Section 8 grants Congress the power to impose a variety of other
“individual mandates” in order to secure collective action. According to
venerable constitutional understandings, Congress may require individuals to
aid in civilian law enforcement, including enforcement of commerce power
139
regulations; to purchase firearms and related gear in anticipation of service in
140
the Militia; to turn gold currency in to the government in exchange for paper
141
142
and even to surrender their property,
thereby removing
currency;
obstructions to congressional regulation (or federal construction) of the
143
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
As a coherent response to numerous collective action problems, the clauses
of Section 8 authorize Congress to compel action when using the grants of

134. 26 U.S.C. § 6012.
135. 13 U.S.C. § 221(a)–(b).
136. 50 U.S.C. app § 453.
137. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g).
139. Hall, supra note 52, at 1855 (discussing THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Hamilton) and a provision
of the Judiciary Act of 1789). See 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (“[T]he United States Marshals Service . . . shall
command all necessary assistance to execute its duties.”). “This section is but the latest version of the
authority first contained in § 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which itself merely reflected the common
law rule that the sheriff had the power to summon the posse comitatus and that the citizen had the duty
to participate if called upon.” Special Deputations of Private Citizens Providing Security to a Former
Cabinet Member, 7 Op. O.L.C. 67, 69 (1983) (quoting the statement in In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535
(1895), that “[i]t is the right, as well as the duty, of every citizen, when called upon by the proper
officer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of his country”); see also Federal
Bureau of Investigation—Statutory Jurisdiction—Authority of Agents Concerning Non-Federal
Offenses, 2 Op. O.L.C. 47, 50 (1978) (“At common law, a constable or sheriff had a right to summon
bystanders to aid him in apprehending a felon, and those summoned were obliged to respond. This rule
retains some vitality today . . . .”) (citation omitted); John Lenoir, The U.S. Marshals’ Posse: A Model
for the 21st Century, 55 FED. LAWYER, Aug. 2008, at 34, 34–35 (observing that “Marshals’ authority to
specially deputize a posse is derived from 28 USC § 566(c)”). The Marshals Service has long declined to
require the assistance of private individuals due to concerns about the reliability of people who do not
want the job. Conversation with Gerald Auerbach, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv. (May 2, 2011).
Mr. Auerbach has been at the U.S.M.S. since 1973.
140. Hall, supra note 52, at 1855–56 (discussing the Militia Act of 1792, which required “every free
able-bodied white male citizen” between the ages of 18 and 45 to obtain at his own expense “a good
musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box
therein to contain not less than twenty four cartridges”).
141. Id. at 1858 (quoting Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935)).
142. Without the power of eminent domain, the government—whether federal, state, or local—
might be unable to solve the holdout problem. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at
139–44.
143. Hall, supra note 52, at 1856 (observing that the Court has upheld congressional use of the
eminent domain power “as a necessary and proper adjunct to the Commerce Clause, when used, for
instance, to mandate the transfer of land for bridges, highways, or canals”) (citations omitted).
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power in the enumerated list, including the commerce power. There is no basis
for treating the Commerce Clause differently from other Section 8 powers. As
144
Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, the
commerce power is “the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
145
which commerce is to be governed.” Marshall, like the constitutional text he
was construing, did not distinguish rule prescriptions that prohibit or permit
146
action from rule prescriptions that compel action. According to the Marshall
Court, “the power over commerce . . . among the several States, is vested in
147
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government.” Just as states
may compel commercial action if they respect constitutional limits, so Congress
may compel commercial action to address problems “among the several States”
if Congress respects independent limits on its authority.
Moreover, it seems ad hoc to diminish the pertinence of the above
authorizations to issue individual mandates by labeling them fundamental
148
duties of citizenship. The Constitution does not identify them as such or
distinguish them on this ground; instead, the Constitution intermingles its
licensing of federal taxation and military power with its authorization of federal
regulation of other subjects that similarly implicate multi-state collective action
problems. Nor is it evident why, from a federalism perspective, Congress should
be empowered to overcome collective action problems facing the states by
compelling activity with respect to fundamental duties of citizenship but not
with respect to other serious societal problems that the states are unable to
address effectively on their own.
An illuminating example concerns the control of communicable diseases.
Imagine that, in order to prevent the spread of a deadly disease across state
lines, the federal government wanted to require individuals in affected areas to
get vaccinated. In light of potentially large spillover effects impinging on the
general welfare, Congress should have the power to mandate vaccination under
Article I, Section 8 without first deciding whether vaccination qualifies as a
149
fundamental duty of citizenship. Moreover, there is little doubt that the
144. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
145. Id. at 196.
146. As the father of two young children, I am required to regulate their behavior. I execute this
responsibility by prohibiting them from doing certain things (for example, running in a parking lot), by
permitting them to do certain things (for example, having a play date), and by requiring them to do
certain things (for example, brushing their teeth and flossing). The requiremetns are no less regulatory
than the permissions or prohibitions.
147. Id. at 197.
148. See Barnett, supra note 69, at 630 (arguing that the duties to “register for the draft and serve if
called, sit on a jury, fill out a census form, and file a tax return” are not “imposed via Congress’s power
to regulate economic behavior,” but instead “have traditionally been considered fundamental duties
that each person owes to the government by virtue of American citizenship or residency”).
149. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession”). For a discussion of this federal quarantine statute and
related measures, see generally KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH
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Supreme Court would uphold such congressional power, presumably under the
150
Commerce Clause. The rationale for allowing federal regulation of this
151
interstate externality under Section 8 is clear and powerful.
The above conclusions of collective action federalism are consistent with the
Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “economic activity” in its contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich
used the phrase “economic activity” to describe typical objects of congressional
regulation, such as the subject matter at issue in those three cases. The Court
did not impose an actus reus requirement in commerce power litigation that
152
ruled out omission regulability. Indeed, Lopez and Raich reaffirmed Wickard,
which upheld a federal regulatory scheme that effectively required farmers to
153
purchase wheat in the interstate market. The Wickard Court stated that
“stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely
154
as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.”
In Wickard, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich, the Court focused decisively on
the object of federal regulation to assess (1) whether it is fairly describable as
“economic” in nature, and, in effect, (2) whether Congress reasonably could
have determined that there is a collective action problem impeding federal
regulation of interstate markets. Having “committed itself to sustaining federal

SERV., RL 33201, FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION AUTHORITY (2007), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33201.pdf
150. Cf. SWENDIMAN & ELSEA, supra note 149, at 4 (“Federal quarantine authority derives from
the Commerce Clause . . . .”). See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, 30, United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1939 (2010) (No. 08–1224):
GENERAL KAGAN: [S]uppose that there was some very contagious form of drugresistant tuberculosis that had—had become prevalent in the prison system, and States
were not able to deal with that, with quarantining these people upon their release date,
and Congress said: You know, the best thing to do is to have the Federal Government act
as the appropriate quarantining authority because we don’t think that States are able to
step up and deal with this problem.
Would anybody say that the Federal Government would not have Article I power to
effect that kind of public safety measure? . . .
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, when I was thinking about your hypothetical, I thought,
well, that’s a pretty easy commerce power argument. . . .
JUSTICE SCALIA: We—we have a Federal agency that’s—that deals with
communicable diseases. It’s part of the National Institute of Health, I believe. Is that
agency ultra vires? I mean, aren’t communicable—I mean, if anything relates to interstate
commerce, it’s communicable diseases, it seems to me.
151. For an (unorthodox) argument that the General Welfare Clause might justify federal
regulation in this circumstance, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 178–79.
152. See supra Part III (discussing two district court opinions that have in effect imposed such a
requirement).
153. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (noting that farmers were “forc[ed] . . . into the
market to buy what they could provide for themselves”); id. at 128–29 (concluding that “Congress may
properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme
of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade
therein at increased prices”).
154. Id. at 128.
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legislation on broad principles of economic practicality,” and underscoring
156
“the importance of a practical conception of the commerce power,” the Court
concluded in essence (albeit not explicitly) that Congress reasonably could have
found such collective action problems in Wickard and Raich, but not in Lopez
157
and Morrison.
V
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION
A. The Commerce Clause Solution to Cost Shifting
Part I of this article introduced the free rider problem of uncompensated
care targeted by the ACA’s minimum coverage provision. This free rider
problem causes a collective action problem for the states. In light of the
economic nature and interstate scope of this collective action problem, the
Commerce Clause justifies the minimum coverage provision.
1. Noneconomic v. Economic
In order for congressional regulation to be valid under the Commerce
Clause in cases allegedly involving substantial effects on interstate commerce,
Supreme Court precedent requires the object of the regulation to be
158
“commercial” or “economic” in nature. The decision whether to purchase
health insurance is “economic” in nature. Because the need for people to access
159
healthcare services is inevitable, unpredictable, and potentially very costly, the
decision whether to obtain health insurance is a decision about how to manage
substantial financial risk. Financially able individuals who decline to purchase
health insurance are making the economic decision to “go bare” with respect to
the risk of serious injury or illness.
There is a close analogy between the conduct of financially able individuals
who decline to purchase health insurance and the decision to “go bare” in a
160
business insurance setting. “Going bare” is a colloquial term in insurance law
used to describe the conduct of a business enterprise that chooses to be
uninsured, or severely underinsured, regarding a risk. For example, a physician
may decide to go bare rather than pay the high cost of a medical malpractice
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 572.
157. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 162–65 (analyzing the cases from a collective action
perspective).
158. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (stressing the economic–noneconomic
distinction); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (same); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (same).
159. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 358 (2006) (considering “the essential features of health care delivery that
distinguish its legal issues from those of other related fields,” and identifying as one of them “the high
cost of care and wide variability of need, which necessitate public or private insurance that
fundamentally alters medical economics”) (emphasis added).
160. I thank my colleague Jonathan Wiener for informing me of the practice of “going bare.”
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161

insurance policy.
An individual or enterprise that goes bare is understood to be making the
economic decision to self-insure, relying either on personal financial resources
or on the protections afforded by federal bankruptcy law in the event the risk
162
materializes. Businesses that go bare are often viewed as engaging in a course
of conduct that entails potentially high economic risk to themselves and
163
others. If bankruptcy results, the costs associated with this financial risk will
have to be paid by creditors.
2. Inactivity v. Activity
Critics of the minimum coverage provision emphasize that it regulates
inactivity. According to these critics, the Supreme Court held in Lopez,
Morrison, and Raich that Congress may regulate only “economic activity” using
164
its commerce power. It follows, they reason, that Congress may not regulate
inactivity using the Commerce Clause. To reiterate the Florida district court’s
holding, “It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that
165
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”
A key premise of critics of the minimum coverage provision is that
constitutional analysis should focus on health insurance markets, not the
166
healthcare market. If one focuses on health insurance markets, then the
provision may seem to “regulate inactivity” or “compel an otherwise passive
167
individual into a commercial transaction with a third party.” Individuals
subject to the provision may be characterized as inactive in the sense that they
do not presently participate in a health insurance market. The provision may be
described as a regulation of inactivity in the sense that it requires such
individuals to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a fee each year.
161. See, e.g., Brian S. Kern, The Naked Truth Behind Going Bare (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://mymedicalmalpracticeinsurance.com/news/?p=1442 (“Have you considered ‘going bare’—or
without medical liability insurance?”) (sidenote).
162. Rosie Cisneros, Malpractice Insurance Costs and Going Bare, LODMELL & LODMELL (June 8,
2007, 11:39 AM), http://www.lodmell.com/malpractice-insurance-cost-going-bare (“Malpractice costs
have become so expensive that more and more physicians are seeking alternatives wherever they can
find them. Some are so angry and frustrated by soaring insurance premiums that they are going ‘bare,’
foregoing costly insurance—relying instead, in some cases, on the threat of bankruptcy to bail them out
of any hefty patient claims. This is a risky choice, indeed.”).
163. Id. (“Going ‘bare,’ especially when it comes to medical malpractice insurance, has never
seemed advisable.”); Kern, supra note 161 (“At first glance, it might seem appealing: you would save a
lot of money by not having to pay liability insurance premiums and you are a far less attractive
malpractice target, as your pockets (and your practice’s) are significantly less deep than your insurance
company’s pockets. But, upon closer look, it is almost never worth it.”) (sidenote).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-motivated crimes of
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567 (1995) (“[P]ossession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”).
165. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1286 (N.D.
Fla. 2011).
166. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Hospital Association, supra note 8.
167. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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Defenders of the minimum coverage provision object to the relatively
narrow level of abstraction at which opponents characterize the object of
congressional regulation. Defenders argue that Congress and the President
168
were concerned about the healthcare market when they enacted the ACA.
169
Defenders observe that almost all Americans participate in this market.
Millions of individuals without health insurance—a significant percentage of
whom can afford to purchase insurance—obtain billions of dollars’ worth of
healthcare services each year and do not pay for them, shifting the costs to
other participants in the healthcare market, including the federal and state
170
governments. Defenders insist that consuming goods or services without
paying is economic activity and that the minimum coverage provision seeks to
regulate this activity.
The above arguments of critics and defenders of the minimum coverage
provision share the premise that it matters whether Congress is regulating
inactivity, as opposed to activity, in relying on its commerce power. This
premise is mistaken. The theory of collective action federalism explains why the
distinction between inactivity and activity has nothing to do with the limits of
the commerce power.
3. Individual v. Collective Action
There appears to be a broad legal consensus that no constitutionally
protected rights are at stake in the litigation over the minimum coverage
provision. Notwithstanding the rhetorical emphasis of opponents of the ACA
171
on themes of individual liberty and freedom from coercion, most do not raise
economic substantive due process objections to the minimum coverage
172
provision, and those who do are rebuffed by otherwise sympathetic judges.
An implication of this consensus is that government at some level may require
individuals to obtain health insurance coverage. The question is which level.
The constitutional answer ought to turn on which level of government is
best situated to address the free rider problem of uncompensated care that an
insurance requirement is designed in part to alleviate. As explained in Part II,
collective action problems include the free rider problems that unavoidably
result once a society mandates access to healthcare in a medical emergency.
Anyone can be grievously injured or fall ill at any moment; such injury or illness
168. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(A) (West 2011) (finding that the minimum coverage
requirement regulates “economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for”).
169. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner & George J. Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1300, 1301 (2010) (“There are few nondiscretionary national markets in which
virtually all Americans inevitably participate.”).
170. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text (documenting these facts).
171. For discussions, see generally Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty of Free Riders: The
Minimum Coverage Provision, Mill’s “Harm Principle,” and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J.L. &
MED. (forthcoming 2012); Bryan Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism,
and the Fight over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177 (2011).
172. See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1161–62 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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173

can be ruinous financially, and almost all who are ill or grievously injured will
end up at emergency rooms where they will expect to receive treatment
174
regardless of whether they are insured. This is because the national political
community is committed to providing stabilizing care for such people regardless
of their ability to pay or insurance status. Federal law requires hospitals that
participate in Medicare and offer emergency services—that is, almost all
hospitals in the United States—to provide stabilizing care to patients who enter
their emergency rooms while experiencing medical emergencies regardless of
175
their ability to pay. This collective commitment is further reflected in state
176
legislation and tort law, as well as in the longstanding mission of most
hospitals in America to provide care to individuals who are unable to pay fully
177
or at all.
When financially able individuals decline to purchase health insurance and
then consume healthcare without paying in full, they free ride on
178
benevolence. Free riding on benevolence can occur when people fail to insure
against harm or reduce its probability and magnitude. The materialization of a
risk generates claims by an unprepared victim on the benevolence of society,
179
which is embodied in statutes and charitable social practices. People who have
the means to purchase health insurance but decline may end up free riding on
the federal and state governments, healthcare providers, insured individuals, or
taxpayers. These participants in the healthcare system will pay much of the cost

173. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (West 2011) (“[Sixty-two] percent of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses.”).
174. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Economics Scholars in Support of Appellant, Virginia v.
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058) (“[T]he health care market is
characterized by five unique factors—the unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of
such need; the high cost of care; the inability of providers to refuse to provide care in emergency
situations; and the very significant cost-shifting that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this
country—which do not obtain in other markets.”).
175. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006).
176. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 42, Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (Nos. 11–1057 & 11–1058) (discussing
state tort liability for failure to provide emergency care).
177. See, e.g., CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S
HOSPITAL SYSTEM 347 (1995) (observing that “the hospital never assumed the guise of rational and
rationalized economic actor during the first three-quarters of the twentieth century”; it “continued into
the twentieth century, as it had begun in the eighteenth, to be clothed with public interest in a way that
challenged categorical distinctions between public and private”; and “[p]rivate hospitals had always
been assumed to serve the community at large—treating the needy”); id. at 352 (seeing “little prospect
of hospitals in general becoming monolithic cost minimizers and profit maximizers,” and predicting that
American society “will feel uncomfortable with a medical system that does not provide a plausible (if
not exactly equal) level of care to the poor and socially isolated”).
178. Cf. PHELPS, supra note 38, at 533 (noting that a solution to the free rider problem “of course, is
to eliminate all laws requiring hospitals (and others) to treat those in need but without the means to
pay for care, but our society appears unwilling to do this”; that “[u]nder current arrangements,
hospitals (and others) must provide this care, and its costs are built into the prices charged to all paying
customers”; and that “[c]reating universal insurance solves this problem because every citizen thereby
is insured automatically, eliminating the free ride”).
179. I thank Robert Cooter for his help in developing the concept of free riding on benevolence.
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of medical treatment rather than let uninsured individuals—the beneficiaries of
180
benevolence—go untreated.
The law can diminish free riding. To overcome risk taking in reliance on the
benevolence of others, the law can require imprudent people to purchase health
181
insurance. Free riding on benevolence provides a reason for action by
182
government at some level.
To determine which level, the key constitutional question, as explained in
Part IV, is whether the states are well situated to diminish free riding on
benevolence by acting alone. The decisive inquiry, in other words, is captured
by the distinction between individual and collective action by states, not the
distinction between inactivity and activity. Free riders may be inactive in a
market for the time being, but this inactivity itself may be a serious problem—
not a reason why Congress is powerless to offer a particularly effective solution.
Using its commerce power, Congress may offer such a solution if the external
costs imposed by free riders spill across state borders, thereby generating a
collective action problem for the states.
When the external costs imposed by free riders spill across state borders,
one state is necessarily free riding on the benevolence of another state. There
are two collective action problems at play: (1) a collective action problem
involving individuals that disrespects state borders, and (2) a collective action
problem involving states. These collective action problems are related. The
collective action problem involving individuals causes the collective action
problem involving states. For example, an uninsured individual in State A may
go to State B for medical care, either temporarily or permanently, because the
publicly financed care options in State A are less available or less generous. In
this situation, the uninsured individual in State A is free riding on insured
individuals in State B, and State A is free riding on State B by not providing
public benefits sufficient to prevent an exodus of its own residents to State B.
The same is true of many other interstate movements.

180. Free riding by beneficiaries causes a second kind of free riding on benevolence—a race to the
bottom among potential benefactors. This race occurs when people shift claims on their benevolence to
others. For example, a wealthy individual who declines to contribute to medical care for the indigent
free rides on the benevolence of others who will pay so that the poor receive care. This race to the
bottom suggests that the demand for benevolence often will exceed the supply, resulting in too little
benevolence. See, e.g., FAMILIES USA, supra note 53, at 4 (“We know that uninsured people often do
not receive health care when they need it.”).
181. To overcome attempts to shift the burdens of charity to others, the law can make everyone
who is financially able contribute to helping others, such as by financing healthcare for the poor
through a tax on income. Medicaid, for instance, avoids this race to the bottom.
182. EMTALA might be viewed as a way in which Congress is bootstrapping its way into a
collective action problem. Free riding on benevolence results not only from the failure of financially
able individuals to obtain health insurance coverage but also from a federal statutory requirement to
treat them. Part of the answer to this bootstrapping objection is that valid federal legislation provides a
permissible baseline against which Congress may use its Section 8 powers. See infra notes 266, 267, 270–
272, and accompanying text (analyzing this issue). Another part of the answer is that EMTALA reflects
a pervasive and longstanding commitment of American society, see, e.g., supra note 177, so that it is
inaccurate to view Congress as determining the constitutional scope of its own authority.
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Thus, whether the minimum coverage provision is within the scope of the
Commerce Clause turns on whether a collective action problem exists “among
183
the several States” or instead is internal to each state. Two pieces of evidence
suggest that the free rider problem of uncompensated care—free riding on
benevolence—exists among the states generally.
First, it is well known that many insurance companies operate in multiple
184
states. It likely follows that the scope of the problem of free riding on
benevolence transcends state borders. When uninsured individuals obtain care
without paying, the actors to whom they shift costs include providers, who raise
their prices, and insurance companies, which raise the insurance premiums that
185
individuals and families must pay.
Because many of these insurance
companies operate in multiple states, this cost shifting likely disrespects state
186
boundaries.
To be sure, even in the post-ACA world, insurance pools and the regulation
187
of insurance remain substantially state specific.
States could impose
regulations that prohibit multi-state insurers from shifting costs from out of
188
state to their residents. Even so, the effects of cost shifting are unlikely to be
state-contained. The overall capital reserves of insurance companies constitute
a larger pool that undergirds all their market segments. Thus, just as market
investments can hurt the overall financial health of insurers, so can poor loss
ratios in one state hurt the ability of insurers to remain in more marginal
markets in other states. Poor loss ratios in a particular state may stretch the
189
overall reserves of insurance companies.
Accordingly, the problem of
uncompensated care in State A likely affects the premiums paid by individuals
and families in State B when the same insurance company offers policies in both
190
states.
Second, free riding on benevolence likely shifts costs across state lines
because of interstate migration. It is empirically uncertain how frequently
different state healthcare regimes cause interstate migrations of individuals on a

183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
184. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (documenting this fact).
185. See supra notes 47–53, 170, and accompanying text (documenting these facts).
186. Cf. Balkin, supra note 10, at 30 (reading the phrase “among the several states” in the
Commerce Clause so that “Congress can regulate interactions that extend in their operation beyond the
bounds of a particular state”) (emphasis added).
187. In useful conversations, Abigail Moncrieff has pressed the argument to which I respond in the
text.
188. For example, a state could decline to approve premiums that are higher than necessary to
cover their own residents.
189. E-mail from Mark A. Hall, Professor of Law & Pub. Health, Wake Forest Univ. (Oct. 12,
2011) (on file with author).
190. Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944) (observing
that insurance involves “a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states composed
of collections of premiums, payments of policy obligations, and the countless documents and
communications which are essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts”).
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191

permanent basis. It is well documented, however, that residents of one state
often move interstate temporarily to access needed medical care. For example,
residents of southwestern Pennsylvania make more than 1,500 emergency room
visits each year to a teaching hospital in West Virginia—the West Virginia
192
University Hospital. Similarly, Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, which is
run by the University of Washington, constitutes the only Level 1 Trauma
Center for a region of the country that includes Washington, Alaska, Montana,
193
and Idaho. “Uninsured individuals who suffer catastrophic injuries from
accidents and other unpredictable events are transported to Harborview for the
care it can uniquely provide. In 2009, Harborview cared for 12,028 patients from
194
states in the region outside of Washington.” Likewise, healthcare providers in
the nation’s capital, which “has made a heroic effort to insure all residents, treat
thousands of residents from Maryland and Virginia, whose public insurance
195
programs are far less generous.” It would be useful if future research could
produce comprehensive data on cross-state hospital use in the United States. It
would also be useful to know how many Americans live close to an interstate
196
border.
The Supreme Court, in a famous “right to travel” case, recognized that
different state healthcare regimes might encourage individuals to move
197
interstate. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Court addressed a
county’s concern that providing free medical care to indigents would encourage
individuals from out of state to relocate to the county. The Court rejected this
rationale for a one-year residency requirement, declaring a violation of the
191. Andrew Koppelman cites a possible example:
[T]he heavy burdens borne by Tennessee’s health care system may be related to the fact
that its most populous city, Memphis, is bordered by Mississippi and Arkansas, which
offer much lower benefits. TennCare insurers are also concerned that patients from other
states may be establishing residency in Tennessee in order to obtain coverage for organ
transplants.
Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 16–17 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/981.pdf (citing,
inter alia, WILLIAM M. MERCER INC., EVALUATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE TENNCARE
PROGRAM—REPORT 9 (1999)). This report wondered “if providers in these bordering states are
encouraging patients to relocate to Tennessee in order to access TennCare.” Id.
192. Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10–cv–91–RV/EMT).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Sara Rosenbaum, Can States Pick Up the Health Reform Torch?, NEW ENG. J. MED., (Feb. 25,
2010), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1001439.
196. True, states end up bearing some of the costs when their residents access healthcare in other
states for which they do not pay. For example, when a New Hampshire resident cannot pay off a large
debt to a Massachusetts hospital, the resident may have to declare bankruptcy, and many of the costs
associated with bankruptcy will stay in New Hampshire. But this just means that New Hampshire’s free
riding is not entirely free. New Hampshire is still paying less than the full cost of the conduct of its
resident because the hospital’s uncompensated costs stay in Massachusetts. Moreover, many of the
resident’s creditors may not be in New Hampshire.
197. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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fundamental right to travel. Notably, however, the Court did not dispute the
factual premise of interstate migration. Instead, the Court seemed to accept its
validity but deemed it constitutionally irrelevant to the scope of the individual
198
right at issue. “An indigent who considers the quality of public hospital
facilities in entering the State,” the Court wrote, “is no less deserving than one
who moves into the State in order to take advantage of its better educational
199
facilities.” Thus the Court in 1974 took seriously the concern that people may
migrate to obtain better healthcare. In view of advancements in technology,
communication, and transportation over the past thirty-eight years, it is more
likely that such interstate migrations occur today. Moreover, the right to travel
would prohibit states from preventing individuals from moving into the state
and taking advantage of its more generous healthcare benefits.
B. The Commerce–Sweeping Clause Solution to Adverse Selection
Just as the minimum coverage provision responds to the two free rider
problems identified in Part II (cost shifting and adverse selection), so there are
at least two sources of congressional power in Article I, Section 8 that support
200
the provision. In addition to being within the scope of the commerce power
standing alone, the minimum coverage provision is independently justified by
the Commerce Clause in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause
201
(also called the Sweeping Clause). There is a straightforward argument that
the provision is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the ACA’s
commerce power regulations of the health insurance industry, thereby
ameliorating the adverse-selection problem that undermines health insurance
markets.
No one disputes that the commerce power supports the ACA provisions
that prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting
conditions, canceling insurance, discriminating based on medical history, and
202
imposing lifetime benefit limits. The Court has long held that Congress may
use the Commerce Clause to regulate insurance markets. “Perhaps no modern
commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as
203
does the insurance business,” wrote the Court in 1944. “This business,” the
Court continued, “is not separated into forty-eight distinct territorial
compartments which function in isolation from each other. Interrelationship,

198. Id. at 263–67.
199. Id. at 264.
200. This article does not address whether the tax power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1,
independently justifies the minimum coverage provision. For an affirmative answer, see generally
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 69.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
202. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a), 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (West 2011).
203. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944) (“Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United
States.”); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(3) (West 2011) (citing South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n as
authority for the proposition that “insurance is interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation”).
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interdependence, and integration of activities in all states in which they operate
204
are practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business.”
The theory of collective action federalism endorses this doctrinal conclusion
because different state regulations of insurance companies can cause collective
action problems. The theoretical rationale for this proposition begins with the
reality of a robust interstate healthcare market in a nation consisting of
demilitarized borders among the states. Insurance companies are mobile
(meaning they can pull up stakes) and often conduct business in several or
205
many states. Private healthcare providers are also potentially mobile, as are
many unhealthy and healthy individuals. The combination of open interstate
borders and potentially mobile participants in the healthcare market means that
the states are likely to get in one another’s way—they are likely to impose
significant costs on one another without paying for them—when one or more
states enact healthcare reforms on their own, including by guaranteeing access
to health insurance and imposing a minimum coverage provision to combat free
riding within their jurisdictions.
Imagine, for example, that a state (call it M) imposes a minimum coverage
provision and prohibits insurance companies from denying individuals coverage
based on preexisting medical conditions. In addition, imagine that State M helps
residents to obtain insurance through a series of tax credits and subsidies, and
through a requirement that private employers provide a certain level of
healthcare to their employees.
Now consider what will likely happen. Because most states today allow
health insurance companies to deny coverage or charge higher premiums based
206
on preexisting conditions, some number of unhealthy individuals are likely to
207
move into State M. Moreover, some number of healthy individuals may move
out and relocate in medically underwritten states, especially if they work in
industries that employ younger, highly skilled labor such as the computer
industry. (The number of people moving interstate likely will depend in part on
204. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 541.
205. See § 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2011) (“[M]ost health insurance is sold by national
or regional health insurance companies . . . .”); Hall, supra note 52, at 1845 (“[T]he insurance markets
in many states are dominated by insurers owned by large national firms.”) (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Aetna, MAPS OF WORLD, http://finance.mapsofworld.com/company/aetna.html (“Aetna [Health
Insurance] operates in all 50 states . . . .”).
206. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COVERAGE DENIED: HOW THE CURRENT HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM LEAVES MILLIONS BEHIND 1 (2009) (“In 45 states across the country, insurance
companies can discriminate against people based on their pre-existing conditions when they try to
purchase health insurance directly from insurance companies in the individual insurance market.
Insurers can deny them coverage, charge higher premiums, and/or refuse to cover that particular
medical condition.”); id. (“A recent national survey estimated that 12.6 million non-elderly adults—36
percent of those who tried to purchase health insurance directly from an insurance company in the
individual insurance market—were in fact discriminated against because of a pre-existing condition in
the previous three years.”).
207. Although sick entrants will have to obtain health insurance coverage and pay premiums, they
will still be free riding on individuals who obtained coverage when they were healthy. The premiums
that sick entrants pay will be lower than the cost of care they will require.
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the size of the exaction imposed by State M for going without insurance.) In
addition, some number of insurers in State M will likely move to states that do
208
not prohibit coverage denials based on preexisting conditions.
Now consider the likely effects on individual workers and firms. Residents
of State M with health problems may find it difficult to relocate to states that
offer less generous healthcare benefits, even to pursue better work
opportunities. Healthy residents of other states may be disinclined to relocate
to State M if doing so means having to purchase health insurance or pay a fee.
Out-of-state firms may be disinclined to move to State M if doing so will raise
the cost of their healthcare obligations to employees.
All of these interstate movements (or immobility) are not mere interstate
effects. They are spillover effects (interstate externalities) because they impose
unpriced costs or benefits on the residents (or treasuries) of different states. For
instance, when sick individuals migrate to State M just because State M
prohibits insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting
conditions, more financial pressure is placed on State M’s healthcare system.
The risk pool is now occupied by higher-cost insureds; insurance premiums
likely will rise for everyone already in the system; the exaction for going
without insurance may have to increase to induce more healthy people to enter
the risk pool; and state taxes may need to increase, either to subsidize the
acquisition of healthcare for those who cannot afford to buy insurance or to pay
the costs of emergency care for uninsured individuals. The states from which
the sick migrants come do not pay for any of the costs imposed on State M as a
209
result of the migration, even though the existence of comparatively less
210
attractive healthcare regimes in these states caused the migration.
The interstate scope of the collective action problem might be more obvious
if, say, the State of Florida attempted to run the scheme described above and
northern states determined that they could reduce budgetary pressures by
paying their indigent senior citizens to relocate in Florida. “The existence of
such a system” would become “a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere,
208. See Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Even if individual states are willing to intervene, insurers
are free to evade state regulation simply by pulling up stakes in any jurisdiction with an unappealing
political and regulatory climate.”).
209. See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of
Constitutional
Compromise,
120
YALE
L.J.
ONLINE
407,
411–12
(2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/971.pdf (arguing that “[t]he structure of health care produces a
race to the bottom that diminishes state autonomy” because “some states provide care for the
uninsured,” which “creates a cross-border moral hazard, allowing neighboring states to offer fewer free
services but permitting citizens of the low-service states to cross the border when they fall ill”); id.
(observing that “the pressure on each state is to free ride on the efforts of its neighbors” because
“states that offer better services attract migrants that drive up prices, taxes, or both”).
210. It is not true, as certain of my interlocutors have urged, that federal power is limitless if it is
ever justified “merely” by interstate migration in response to different state regulatory regimes. To
justify federal intervention, the amount of migration at issue may not be trivial. For example, the
phenomenon of “job lock” in response to different state healthcare regimes is well documented. See,
e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 424 (2d ed. 2007) (finding that
“workers with health insurance are about 25% less likely to change jobs because of that insurance”).
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encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose.” Even where the
external costs are less obvious, states may still face difficulties in attempting to
overcome the collective action problem on their own. “Only a power that is
212
national can serve the interests of all.”
Evidence past and present supports many of the theoretical predictions
offered above. Historically, progressive legislation passed by one state or region
sometimes gave an advantage to other states or regions in interstate economic
competition. For example, there is a well-understood connection between
Progressive Era reform and manufacturing capital flight from the Northeast and
Midwest to the South. During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, northern states were enacting progressive labor laws while southern
213
states imposed few legal constraints. (The Supreme Court’s key invalidations
of federal child labor legislation, enacted in part to counteract the race to the
214
bottom, arose out of North Carolina. ) One consequence of this divergence in
state laws was a movement of economic enterprises from the North to the
South.
One contemporaneous commentator, Edward Porritt, discussed the
relationship between labor progressivism and capital flight in the context of
215
textile looms moving southwards. Writing in 1896, Mr. Porritt observed that
“[t]he greatest emphasis is laid by the [New England] manufacturers on the fact
216
that there are no labor laws worth speaking about in the South.” One
manufacturer confessed that he did
not care whether the working day is ten hours or nine hours, provided it is made
the same for everybody. Then we would all stand on one level. But now the man
in the South is not afraid of legislation, because it comes to him last. The man
who is afraid is the man to whom legislation comes first; he is the man who has

211. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s old-age
pension program).
212. Id. For a discussion of the collective action reasoning in Helvering and Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 168–69.
213. See, e.g., Philip M. Holleran, Family Income and Child Labor in Carolina Cotton Mills, 21 SOC.
SCI. HIST. 297, 301 (1997) (focusing “on mill families in North Carolina and South Carolina, where
child labor and the family labor system were most deeply entrenched”); id. (“The two states ranked
second and first, respectively, in the nation in employment of children in cotton mills from 1899
through 1914.”).
214. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal ban on the shipment in
interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor
Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating a federal excise “tax” on the net profits of employers that
employed children based on a distinction between impermissible “regulatory” and permissible
“revenue raising” exactions).
215. Edward Porritt, The Cotton Mills in the South, 18 NEW ENG. MAG. 575, 575 (1896) (“Not a
little New England capital has already been invested in some of the new southern [cotton
manufacturing] enterprises; and in Massachusetts especially there has been much discussion, both
among mill owners and among working men, of the conditions of manufacture and labor in the South,
as affecting a possible large transfer thither of the cotton industries of the North.”). I thank Ed
Balleison for this reference.
216. Id. at 578.
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217

Northern states paid a price for their (relative) humanity. They suffered
financially by putting businesses that initially were located there at a
218
competitive disadvantage relative to businesses in the South. Mr. Porritt
concluded his remarkable account by observing that the states would not
address the collective action problem on their own any time soon:
At the present time, when southern cotton mills are driving as hard as they can
go, and the South is in the enjoyment of a new prosperity, the southern cotton
states would be even less disposed to go into an interstate conference than were
some of the European nations to discuss
international labor problems at the
219
suggestion of the Emperor of Germany.

Fast forwarding to the present, it is well known that the general welfare
suffers when individuals decline better job opportunities in another state
because they cannot afford the loss of health insurance benefits they would
220
221
suffer if they moved. Health economists call this phenomenon “job lock.”
Moreover, it is well documented that numerous insurers moved to other states
when their home state banned coverage denials based on preexisting conditions.
For example, almost every insurer left the state when Kentucky passed reform
222
legislation; only one private insurer and one state-run insurer remained.
223
224
225
Insurers also left Washington, New York, and several other states.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 59 (2002) (observing
that Massachusetts was no longer the most progressive state on child labor matters after 1900 because it
was “[t]ied so heavily to the textile industry, the tremendous growth of the industry in the South
presented a competitive menace,” and “part of the South’s competitive advantage derived from
pervasive child labor,” so that “Massachusetts found itself unable to continue advancing its child labor
standards without harm to industrial interests”); STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW 9 (1968) (noting the charge of “northern
manufacturers,” including “the New England textile industry,” that “the south’s competitive advantage
resulted principally from the exploitation of children and the consequent depressed scale of adult
wages,” and concluding that “[t]his explanation was close to the truth”).
219. Porritt, supra note 215, at 586. Of course, interstate capital migration did not end with the
Progressive Era. For example, Jefferson Cowie offers a rich comparative social history of industrial
relocation from the 1930s to the 1990s. He chronicles one major corporation’s migrations from the
Northeast to the Midwest, then to the South, and finally to Mexico in search of stable, cheap, and
pliable labor. See generally JEFFERSON COWIE, CAPITAL MOVES: RCA’S SEVENTY-YEAR QUEST FOR
CHEAP LABOR (1999).
220. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 195, at e29(3) (“[I]n a modern economy, people need to be
able to move interstate in order to pursue economic opportunities and participate in a changing labor
market.”); cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 149 (“In the eighteenth century, America faced the
problem of creating a unified market for goods, capital, and labor. Legal obstacles to the movement of
resources inhibit national markets. In contrast, a uniform regulatory framework lubricates national
markets for some goods.”).
221. See, e.g., PHELPS, supra note 38, at 324–25. Congress attempted to address the matter in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936.
222. See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington,
Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 133 (2000).
223. Id.
224. Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW
71 (2000).
225. See infra note 250 (discussing surveys reporting similar results of healthcare reform in several

SIEGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

66

4/3/2012 11:28 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75:29

These states, however, did not impose a minimum coverage provision, and
Congress found that Massachusetts has been substantially more successful in
226
preventing an exodus of insurers by imposing one. The question is whether
other states would be able to enact similar healthcare legislation—and if not,
why not? Does the apparent success of Massachusetts in achieving nearuniversal coverage without causing insurers to leave demonstrate that the
interstate spillover effects are modest at best, such that states can “go it alone”
without incurring prohibitive costs?
There are several reasons to believe that few states could achieve what
Massachusetts achieved. Some of these reasons do not appear attributable to
227
the existence of sister states. They include the relatively low number of
uninsured residents in Massachusetts when it enacted reform. Only 9% of its
residents were uninsured when the state adopted universal coverage in 2006
228
compared with 15% in the nation as a whole today. Moreover, Massachusetts
229
had a relatively healthy economy and ample financial resources when it acted.
By contrast, Texas and California together were home to 12.7 million uninsured
230
individuals in 2008, and their financial resources are severely constrained. In
231
addition, healthcare costs in Massachusetts are continuing to rise. For
example, “per capita spending on health care in Massachusetts is 15% higher
than in the rest of the nation, even when accounting for the state’s wages and
232
spending on medical research and education.”
Federalism problems may also be impeding other states from attempting to
replicate the Massachusetts experiment. Strikingly, Massachusetts is the only
state that has succeeded in passing healthcare reform legislation that shares the
basic objectives and approaches of the ACA. (Contrast this situation with the
states).
226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(D) (West 2011) (“In Massachusetts, a similar requirement has
strengthened private employer-based coverage: despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.”); see Amitabh Chandra et al., The
Importance of the Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 295
(2011) (offering evidence suggesting that the Massachusetts “mandate had a causal role in improving
risk selection”).
227. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Today, between the surging numbers of uninsured,
collapsing state economies, and a decided shift in the culture and politics of government intervention,
another Massachusetts is out of the question.”).
228. LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 90.
229. Rosenbaum, supra note 195 (“Massachusetts must be understood as the rarity rather than the
norm.”).
230. Id.
231. “Massachusetts is grappling with escalating health care costs which are consuming a greater
portion of the economy and lowering real wage growth.” STANLEY S. WALLACK ET AL.,
MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS PART I: THE MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: COSTS, STRUCTURE, AND METHODS USED BY PRIVATE INSURERS TO PAY
PROVIDERS (February 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dhcfp/r/cost-trends-files/part1-system-incontext.pdf.
232. DIV. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POLICY, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS:
2010 FINAL REPORT (April 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/dhcfp/cost-trend-docs/final-reportdocs/health-care-cost-trends-2010-final-report.pdf.
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more than forty states that had enacted laws banning guns in schools when
233
Congress passed the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. ) The explanation
for this state of affairs is not lack of political support for the ACA in every state
except Massachusetts. The ACA was no bolt from the blue. The President (like
his Democratic rivals for the 2008 presidential nomination) campaigned on
healthcare reform, and the ACA was approved by well more than a majority
234
(albeit a partisan majority) of the Senate. Moreover, the nation remains
divided over the law. A March 2012 poll found that, “[o]f those who say they
235
understand the law, 45 percent approve and 51 percent oppose.” In all
likelihood, part of the explanation for the current situation at the state level is
that the federalism problems associated with state-by-state solutions are
236
significant—and are perceived by state legislators to be significant.
To fully answer the question, however, further information about what is
going on in Massachusetts would be helpful. The theory of collective action
federalism directs research towards the question whether healthcare reform in
Massachusetts has been causing migration to and from the state by healthy
237
individuals, sick individuals, insurers, and providers. There presently do not
exist good data on mobility in and out of Massachusetts caused by the state’s
238
legislative efforts. Opponents of the ACA would be well served if they could
show that spillover effects and free riding by sister states have not been
substantially undermining the efficacy of Massachusetts’s own attempt to
233. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Kennedy’s legislative count in
Lopez).
234. The ACA received 60 votes in the Senate (58 Democrats, 2 Independents). See Senate Vote on
Passage: H.R. 3590 [111th]: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=s2009-396. The vote in the House of Representatives
was
219
to
212.
See
House
Vote
#165
(Mar.
21,
2010),
GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2010-165. The House vote was so close in part
because of the opposition of some Democrats to the Senate healthcare bill, on which the House was
voting. These Democrats wanted the bill to include tighter limits on insurance coverage for abortions.
See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Rally to Obama’s Call for Health Vote, N.Y.
Mar.
21,
2010,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
TIMES,
9904E5DC1039F932A15750C0A9669D8B63&pagewanted=all.
235. Dalia Sussman, Helene Cooper & Kate Phillips, Most Oppose at Least Part of Overhaul, Poll
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/most-americanswant-health-care-law-overturned-or-changed-poll-finds.html?_r=2&sq=health.
236. See Koppelman, supra note 191, at 17–18 (arguing that the factual uncertainty about the
existence and scope of a race to the bottom is part of the collective action problem).
237. Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 10, at 154 (calling for extensive fact finding on the scope of
public goods, externalities, and markets).
238. E-mail from Jonathan Gruber, Professor of Econ., Mass. Inst. of Techn. (Apr. 26, 2011) (on
file with author). The present size of the exaction in Massachusetts—roughly $1,000, see LANDMARK,
supra note 39, at 91—may be too small to be causing relatively young and healthy individuals to leave
the state who would otherwise stay. Other expenses, like relative local tax burdens, may be more
significant to an individual’s financial calculation, yet also may not cause substantial flight in light of all
the other reasons (such as job opportunities and family ties) that determine an individual’s place of
residency. By the same token, the modest size of the Massachusetts exaction for noncompliance may be
causing older, unhealthy individuals to move to the state. Only time (and research) will tell. If it turns
out that there is little in-migration of sick people, part of the explanation may be that Medicare and
Medicaid already solve the worst of the federalism problem.

SIEGEL (DO NOT DELETE)

68

4/3/2012 11:28 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 75:29

provide universal access to healthcare. Defenders of the ACA would be well
239
served if they could show the opposite.
This available evidence, however, makes out a reasonably strong prima facie
case for federal regulation—at least as strong as what one usually encounters to
240
justify use of the commerce power. Accordingly, the commerce power
supports the ACA’s effort to broaden the availability of health insurance by
imposing specific terms on health insurance contracts sold throughout the
country. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “to govern affairs
which the individual states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not
241
fully capable of governing.”
Notably, constitutional critics of the ACA do not tend to argue that
preventing insurers from denying coverage to people is best left for the states to
address on an individual basis. For example, Tea Party activists who issued the
“Contract from America” called for replacing the ACA “with a system that
actually makes health care and health insurance more affordable by enabling a
competitive, open, and transparent free-market health care and health
242
insurance system that isn’t restricted by state boundaries.” It is not evident how
the states acting individually possess either the authority or the ability to
accomplish this result. Unlike in past constitutional litigation over guns in
schools, violence against women, and medical marijuana, the opponents of the
federal law do not attempt to explain how, if a state or local government
“determines that [insurance market reforms] are necessary and wise to deter
239. A 2005 Report of the Inspector General of Massachusetts may suggest problems with out-ofstate residents using the state’s more generous healthcare system. The report examines the
Massachusetts safety net pool prior to the 2007 reforms. The state’s Uncompensated Care Pool
“provides reimbursement to hospitals, hospital-based clinics, and community health centers for
providing free or partially-subsidized medical services to uninsured or underinsured patients.” OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., ONGOING REVIEW OF THE UNCOMPENSATED
CARE POOL PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 240 OF THE ACTS OF 2004: SECOND REPORT TO THE HOUSE
AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1 (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/ig/publ/poolrpt.pdf. Although the report does not specifically find abuse from out
of state, it does identify problems with the documentation of the residency status of claimants:
The audit firm contracted by the Inspector General reviewed Uncompensated Care Pool
claims, comparing the address on the application with the backup documentation
provided to the hospital as required by pool regulations. Documents proving residency
include copies of drivers’ licenses, utility bills, pay stubs, voter identification cards, and
affidavits. . . . For hospital fiscal years 2003, 2004, and the first five months of 2005, the
auditors found that 12.9 percent, 5.5 percent, and 6.4 percent respectively of the claims
tested lacked adequate documentation supporting residency status.
Id. at 49–50.
240. In Raich, for example, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the deference exhibited by the Court
in upholding federal power to regulate medical marijuana use authorized by state law. She conceded
that the Court’s “arguments about the effect of the [California law] on the national market . . . are
plausible; if borne out in fact they could justify prosecuting [state] patients under the federal CSA.” But
she insisted that “without substantiation, they add little to the CSA’s conclusory statements.” Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 56–57 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
241. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 525 (1944).
242. THE CONTRACT FROM AMERICA, http://www.contractfromamerica.com/Idea.aspx (emphasis
added).
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[insurers from denying people coverage], the reserved powers of the States are
243
sufficient to enact those measures.” This may be because “[s]tates have had
decades to enact broad reforms, yet the record has been one of futility despite
244
enormous effort.” The states may be too interdependent for each one to solve
the problem on its own.
Although Congress had the authority to enact the ACA’s restrictions of
insurance companies, it would have been foolish to pass them without also
enacting the minimum coverage provision. Insurance companies may not be
financially viable if the law denies them the capacity to control costs through
245
coverage restrictions without preventing market timing behavior. As Congress
found, “[I]f there were no [coverage] requirement, many individuals would wait
246
to purchase health insurance until they needed care.”
As explained in Part II, this adverse-selection problem occurs when
individuals with higher expected healthcare costs are more likely to purchase
insurance than individuals with lower expected costs. The market for health
insurance attracts adverse selection, even absent the ACA’s restrictions on
insurers but especially with them, because individuals know more about their
247
health status than insurance companies do. This information asymmetry
creates an incentive for individuals to free ride by entering the market only
when they expect to require expensive care. The minimum coverage provision
248
is designed in part to combat this free rider problem. The predicted
consequence of the adverse-selection problem absent an insurance requirement
249
is a substantial rise in insurance rates. Much empirical evidence confirms this
243. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
244. Rosenbaum, supra note 195.
245. See Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at 3 (“Without an individual
mandate requirement, more individuals will make the rational economic decision to wait to purchase
coverage until they expect to need health care services. If imposed without an individual mandate
provision, the market reform provisions would reinforce this ‘wait-and-see’ approach by allowing
individuals to move in and out of the market as they expect to need coverage, undermining the very
purpose of insurance to pool and spread risk.”).
246. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West 2011). Congress further found that “[b]y significantly
increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act,
will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums,” and that “[t]he requirement is essential to
creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.” Id; see also id. §
18091(a)(2)(J) (“The requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not
require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.”).
247. See PHELPS, supra note 38, at 318 (noting the “risk . . . that insurance companies will put an
insurance plan into the market that uses one set of actuarial projections about the costs of insured
people but ends up attracting a special subset of the population with unusually high health care costs”).
248. See id. at 533 (describing the market failure resulting from asymmetric information as
“[p]erhaps the most substantial argument for universal insurance”). For the classic article on
asymmetric information, which earned its author the Nobel Prize in Economics, see George A.
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488
(l970).
249. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO
OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE 2 (June 16, 2010) (predicting a 15 to 20% increase in premiums for new
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250

prediction. Because of the close connection between the minimum coverage
provision and the ACA provisions that restrict insurers, the Necessary and
251
Proper Clause offers a strong constitutional justification for the provision.
One federal court that invalidated the provision erred in asserting that “[i]f
a person’s decision not to purchase health insurance at a particular point in time
does not constitute the type of economic activity subject to regulation under the
Commerce Clause, then logically an attempt to enforce such provision under
252
the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the Constitution.”
253
254
From McCulloch v. Maryland to United States v. Comstock, the Supreme
Court has understood the Sweeping Clause differently. It has understood the
clause to authorize Congress to employ means that are otherwise outside the
scope of Section 8 in order to achieve regulatory objectives that are within the
255
scope of Section 8 (or some other part of the Constitution). This is why, under
a Necessary and Proper Clause rationale, it does not matter whether the
minimum coverage provision itself solves a collective action problem facing the
256
states. To be authorized by the Sweeping Clause, it suffices that the provision
is a useful adjunct to the commerce-power regulations of the insurance industry,
which do solve collective action problems for the states.
Critics might respond that if the minimum coverage provision were held
nongroup policies relative to current law absent the mandate); Bradley Herring, An Economic
Perspective on the Individual Mandate’s Severability from the ACA, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMpv1101519 (noting the estimation of MIT economist
Jonathan Gruber that only eight million people (instead of thirty-two million) would join the ranks of
the insured if the ACA had no mandate); Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at
13–15 (“[T]he common theme in the economic and actuarial literature is that premiums increase and
coverage rates fall when insurance market reforms are enacted without an individual mandate.”).
250. Rosenbaum & Gruber, supra note 53, at 403 (“Five states have tried to undertake reforms . . .
without enacting an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states with the most
expensive nongroup health insurance.”); Brief for America’s Health Insurance Plans, supra note 54, at
15–26 (surveying the experience of Maine, New Jersey, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Washington, New
York, Vermont, and Massachusetts in passing reform legislation without a mandate and finding a
common trend of “destabilization of individual markets, increases in premiums, and declines in
enrollment”).
251. One could also invoke the comprehensive regulatory scheme rationale of Lopez and Raich.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (quoting the majority opinion in Lopez).
252. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779 (E.D. Va. 2010).
253. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405–07, 421 (1819).
254. 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956–58 (2010).
255. For example, in Comstock the Justices debated the standard of review courts should apply to
federal legislation that is defended as resting on the Necessary and Proper Clause. The majority,
consisting of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, stated that
“in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to
enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Id. at 1956 (citation
omitted). By contrast, Justice Kennedy would insist on “a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical
demonstration.” Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Alito seemed to endorse
Justice Kennedy’s more demanding standard. Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
256. Once Congress prohibits the underwriting practices of insurers, each state has an incentive to
impose a minimum coverage provision (or to search for an effective substitute) in order to prevent
insurers from moving to sister states that require residents to possess health insurance.
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unconstitutional, Congress could try to combat the adverse-selection problem in
other ways. For example, Congress could provide higher subsidies to tempt
257
healthier individuals into the insurance pool. Congress, however, could always
spend more money on a problem, including by guaranteeing every American
free and comprehensive access to healthcare and raising taxes to finance the
program. The proper constitutional inquiry does not question the amount of
money that Congress elected to spend.
Alternatively, Congress could automatically enroll individuals in insurance
258
as a default but allow them to opt out if they do not want coverage. Congress
could also impose limited open-enrollment periods and penalties for late
259
260
enrollment. Medicare uses some of these approaches. The context of private
health insurance, however, is significantly different; it is uncertain whether
these alternative methods would be nearly as effective in achieving high rates of
261
enrollment as the minimum coverage provision. The answer would depend in
262
part on the size of the exactions for going without insurance. Economist
Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—a defender of
the minimum coverage provision—examined auto-enrollment and late
enrollment penalties, finding that “both alternatives significantly erode the
gains in public health and insurance affordability made possible by the
263
Affordable Care Act.”
However this forecasting debate turns out, there is little doubt that the
minimum coverage provision satisfies the deferential McCulloch standard
264
recently reaffirmed in Comstock. The provision would also likely survive a

257. See, e.g., Chandra et al., supra note 226 (analyzing the approaches of mandates and subsidies
and concluding that “the higher the subsidies, the smaller the role for an individual mandate”).
258. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Without the Individual Mandate: Replacing the
Individual Mandate Would Significantly Erode Coverage Gains and Raise Premiums for Health Care
Customers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 3–5 (Feb. 2011) http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/
pdf/gruber_mandate.pdf.
259. See Herring, supra note 249; Gruber, supra note 258, at 5–7.
260. Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient costs for individuals enrolled in Medicare, combines
auto-enrollment with a late enrollment penalty of ten percent of premiums for each year of delay. See
Herring, supra note 249; Gruber, supra note 258, at 5. Moreover, the Medicare Part D prescription drug
plan imposes a penalty for late enrollment. See id.
261. See Gruber, supra note 258, at 3–4 (discussing differences between the two settings, including
the incentive of employers to encourage participation and the likelihood that young employees have
already considered participation).
262. For an analysis of the efficacy of individual mandates in various contexts, see generally Sherry
A. Glied et al., Consider It Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 HEALTH
AFF. 1612 (2007). The authors find that the efficacy of an individual mandate turns on the cost of
compliance, the exactions for noncompliance, and the extent to which compliance is enforced in a
timely manner. Id. at 1613.
263. Gruber, supra note 258, at 1. Specifically, Gruber found that “no alternative to the individual
mandate can cover more than two-thirds as many uninsured as the Affordable Care Act does”; that “no
alternative to the mandate saves much money”; and that “any alternative imposes much higher costs on
those buying insurance in the new health insurance exchanges as the healthiest opt out and the less
healthy face increased premiums.” Id. at 7.
264. See supra note 255 (discussing the standard of review articulated by the Court in Comstock).
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more demanding means–ends test, such as Justice Kennedy’s insistence on “a
265
demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration.”
Critics of the provision also object that Congress may not invoke the
Necessary and Proper Clause to cure an adverse-selection problem that
Congress itself has largely created by using its commerce power. In the view of
critics, Congress may not invoke the Sweeping Clause to justify legislation that
ameliorates a problem of its own making. “[R]ather than being used to
implement or facilitate enforcement of the Act’s insurance industry reforms,”
the Florida district court wrote, “the individual mandate is actually being used
266
as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself.” The court
reasoned that Congress may not use the Sweeping Clause this way because it
“would have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more
dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the
267
statutory fix would be.”
Similarly, Randy Barnett cautions that Americans should “[l]ook at what is
happening here. Congress exercises its commerce power to impose mandates on
insurance companies, and then claims these insurance mandates will not have
their desired effects unless it can impose mandates on the people—which would
268
be unconstitutional if imposed on their own.” Barnett submits that “[b]y this
reasoning, the Congress would now have the general police power the Supreme
Court has always denied it possessed,” for “[a]ll Congress need do is adopt a
broad regulatory scheme that won’t work the way Congress likes unless it can
269
mandate any form of private conduct it wishes.”
The foregoing concerns about bootstrapping are problematic because it is
often difficult to accomplish much good in the world without also doing some
270
bad. Many actions have both desirable consequences and negative side effects,
and the Court from McCulloch to Comstock has recognized this fact, allowing
Congress to address both. (In this regard, federal laws are like many medical
interventions.) If American constitutional law were otherwise, Comstock would
have come out the other way, for the federal statute under review addressed a
collective action problem caused in part by Congress when it authorized long
271
periods of incarceration in remote federal prisons. If the law were otherwise,
Congress would be precluded from banning the exclusionary practices of

265. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
266. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1297 (N.D.
Fla. 2011).
267. Id.
268. Hearing On The Constitutionality Of The Affordable Care Act Before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (2011) (statement of Randy E. Barnett), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02%20Barnett%20Testimony.pdf.
269. Id.
270. See Koppelman, supra note 191.
271. See supra note 131–133, and accompanying text (discussing the multi-state collective action
problem that Congress helped to create by severing state ties through long federal prison terms).
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insurers unless it were willing to run the risk of destroying health insurance
272
markets.
In any event, concerns about bootstrapping are beside the point in the
context of healthcare reform. This is because the adverse-selection problem that
undermines insurance markets long predates the ACA. Accordingly, the
minimum coverage provision is justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause
even without reference to the ACA’s prohibitions on underwriting. This is an
underappreciated constitutional rationale for the provision.
Although the bootstrapping objection is misguided, the concern animating
it—fear of unlimited federal power—warrants consideration. The Supreme
Court has addressed this concern by distinguishing economic subject matter
from noneconomic subject matter. The theory of collective action federalism
addresses this concern by distinguishing problems that require individual action
by states from problems that require collective action.
VI
CONCLUSION
In at least two independently sufficient ways, the minimum coverage
provision encounters no constitutional impediment sounding in federalism. It
would be perplexing to conclude otherwise in light of the conceded
constitutional validity of other potential approaches to healthcare reform.
These alternatives include raising everyone’s taxes by the amount of the
exaction for non-insurance in the ACA and then providing a federal tax credit
only to insured individuals that equals the amount of this exaction. A
requirement to obtain healthcare coverage or pay $X is materially equivalent to
273
a requirement that only insured individuals need not pay $X in taxes.
Another concededly constitutional alternative to the ACA is more
274
ambitious. Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, Congress could
pass a statute establishing “a government-run, ‘single-payer’ system such as
Canada’s—the ‘Medicare for all’ approach advocated by many American
liberals for years, but sharply opposed by insurers and many medical
275
providers.” Instead of securing a much larger role for the federal government
272. Or, as Andrew Koppelman has pointed out, Congress would be prohibited from criminalizing
robbery of the mails because such a problem does not arise until Congress elects to establish a post
office. Koppelman, supra note 191.
273. For an analysis of the material equivalences between taxes and regulations backed by certain
exactions, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 69.
274. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act’s old-age
pension program); see also Mark A. Hall, Health Care Reform—What Went Wrong on the Way to the
Courthouse, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295 (2011) (“Under long-established Supreme Court precedent,
Congress would have authority, if it wanted, to enact a single-payer socialized insurance system, using
its powers to tax and spend ‘for the general welfare.’”); Mariner & Annas, supra note 169, at 1301
(“Other clearly constitutional approaches were available, including Medicare for All, or simply raising
the income or payroll tax to pay for health benefits, but these would have been even more
objectionable to those who are raising Commerce Clause problems with the ACA.”).
275. LANDMARK, supra note 39, at 68.
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276

in the interstate healthcare market, Congress passed the ACA, which “seeks
to expand the number of people covered and begin the work of restraining costs
277
by building on the existing structure of private insurance.”
The ACA, in other words, is a “market-based approach” that “bears clear
resemblance to the leading Republican alternative to the Clinton plan, to
proposals developed by the conservative Heritage Foundation, and to the 2006
legislation signed by Republican Governor Mitt Romney that created universal
278
coverage in Massachusetts.” If the constitutional concern raised by the
minimum coverage provision is limitless federal power—a rationale for
279
congressional authority that lacks “logical limitation” —then it is puzzling why
Congress may more completely displace the states (and more substantially
restrict individual liberty) by authorizing a greater role for the federal
280
government in regulating private conduct.
The solution to this puzzle is straightforward: Either making the financial
decision to go without insurance qualifies as “activity,” as others have argued,
or the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision does not turn on
whether Congress is regulating “inactivity,” as I have shown here. The
inactivity–activity distinction does not even partially define the limits of the
Commerce Clause. Rather, as identified by the theory of collective action
federalism, a better constitutional distinction is between individual action and
collective action by states. This is a structurally sound place to look for limits on
the commerce power.
The subject matter targeted by the minimum coverage provision is economic
in nature. Moreover, Congress reasonably concluded that the provision
addresses two collective action problems for the states: preventing cost shifting
and guaranteeing access to health insurance while avoiding adverse selection.
Accordingly, the minimum coverage provision is within the scope of the
Commerce Clause, either alone or in combination with the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
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